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Article 7

The Impacts and Issues Surrounding the Regulatory
Confiscation of Real Property
Even the wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge great uncertainty
about the scope of this Court's takings jurisprudence. 1
With some exceptions, the decisional law is largely characterized by
confusing and incompatible results, often explained in conclusionary
terminology, circular reasoning, and empty rhetoric. 2

I.

INTRODUCTION

A police power regulation 3 which is valid in all other due process
respects may nevertheless be invalid" under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments 6 if it is "so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires compensation." 6 A regulation is constitutionally
I. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3163 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
2. Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1971).
3. Throughout this comment the term "regulation" will be used generically when referring
to any form of governmental "interference" with private real property, regardless of whether the
actual restriction at issue is in the form of a zoning ordinance, a statutory act, a municipal order, a
court order, an administrative order, etc. This comment will also refer to "regulation" in the
singular with the understanding that several regulations may in fact be at issue.
4. The police power defines merely a threshold test of the legitimacy of any [real property J regulation. Although a given measure may be reasonably related to the health,
safety, morals or general welfare of society, it may still violate the "takings clause" of
the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Comment, Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1462 (1978) [hereinafter
Comment, Zoning]. Cf Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3147 n.4 ("the state's action, even if otherwise valid
might violate either the incorporated takings clause or the equal protection clause."). See infra
notes 287-545 and accompanying text for a discussion of when a regulation is "otherwise valid."
5. "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNST.
amend. V. The fifth amendment takings clause is applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. See Chicago B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
6. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). The recognition that a regulation may
"take" property is a fairly recent judicial development. The Court originally compartmentalized
the due process clause and the just compensation clause according to the governmental power they
were intended to limit. The just compensation clause was interpreted as a limitation only upon the
sovereign powers of eminent domain, while the due process clause was the only proper limitation
upon regulations. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887) (refusing to apply to a nuisance regulation the language or principles of Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177-78
(13 Wall. 1872) (an inverse condemnation case based upon a physical invasion),). See infra note
36 quoting the relevant language from Pumpelly.
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"onerous" when it "has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use
of the property" 7 by "forcing some people alone to bear public burdens,
which in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole." 8 In general, "the question at bottom is upon whom the loss of
the changes desired should fall." 9
The contention of a "regulatory taking claim" 10 is that the challenged regulation unfairly demands and takes "something more and
This compartmentalization, however, did not last long. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922), the fountainhead of regulatory taking jurisprudence, Justice Holmes stated
that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if a regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking." /d. at 415 (emphasis added). See also First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, I 07 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (1987) (expressly affirming the language
of Pumpelly which was denied in Mugler as applying to regulatory taking claims).
Some have argued that Justice Holmes' use of the word "taking" was meant in a metaphorical manner because no compensation was awarded; a regulation which "goes too far" is merely a
violation of the due process clause and only requires invalidation, not compensation. See e.g.,
Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 179-200 (1985). Regardless of Justice
Holmes' original meaning, the subsequent cases, in particular the recent case of First f,'nglish, I 07
S. Ct. 2378 (recision of an offensive regulation is not an adequate constitutional remedy under the
just compensation clause, therefore dismissal of plaintiff's claim for compensation was improper;
case remanded for trial), leaves little doubt that the Court has recognized, and will continue to
recognize that a regulation may "take" property and therefore is subject to the just compensation
clause, as well as the due process clause. See Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue, I B.Y.U. J.
PuB. L. 261, 265-66 (1987) [hereinafter Berger].
7. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (emphasis
added).
8. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
9. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416. See e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104.
The question of this case is whether the cost associated with the eity of New York's
desire to preserve a limited number of "landmarks" within its borders must be borne
by all of its taxpayers or whether it can instead be imposed entirely on the owners of
the individual properties.
ld. at 139 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Cj Pennell v. City of San Jose, 56 U.S.L.W. 4168, 4173
(U.S. Feb. 24, 1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part):
The traditional manner in which American Government has met the problem of
those who cannot pay reasonable prices for privately sold necessities . . has been the
distribution to such persons of funds raised from the public at large through taxes.
Here the city
is using the occasion of rent regulation
to establish a welfare
program privately funded by those landlords who happen to have 'hardship' tenants.
10. All regulations may be placed into one of three categories:
I) Regulations which the government may not enforce because they are a violation of
the due process clause, see infra notes 287-345 and accompanying text
2) Regulations which the government may enforce only if it compensates the owner for
its "unfair" effect upon the property owner, and
3) Regulations which the government may enforce as a proper exercise of the police
power without paying compensation to the owner.
Cf Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 202 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(listing the forgoing as "permanent harms").
Governments would naturally like to have all of their regulations qualify for the last category, while private property holders would like to place harsh regulations into one of the first two
categories. The "regulatory taking claim" is the mechanism through which property owner claims
that a regulation belongs in the second category and is thereby unenforceable.
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different" 11 from certain individual property owners in order to improve society for the rest of the public. 12 This inquiry requires drawing
"the line which separates [permissible] regulation from confiscation" 13
on a case by case basis.
The Supreme Court has indicated that, other than the general
principles of "justice and fairness," 14 there is no "set formula" 111 available16 for knowing when a regulation "goes too far." 17 The Court's re11. [The fifth amendment] prevents the public from loading upon one individual more
than his just share of the burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to
the public something more and different from that which is exacted from other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him.
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 337 (1893) (emphasis added).
12. In theory, courts must ask whether a regulation exact[ s] such a disproportionate
sacrifice from individual property holders relative to their peers and to their expectations that the affected individuals may be seen as having been treated solely as a means
in a process of social engineering.
Comment, Zoning, supra note 4, at 1492.
For an alternative approach to determining whether a regulation takes something more and
different from individuals, see Comment, Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain to Test for
a Violation of Due Process or a Taking Without just Compensation, 54 WASH. L. REV. 315,
321-24 (1979) (identifying four elements to consider in determining when a person is being forced
to bear more than his fair share; distribution, quality, quantity and reliance) [hereinafter Comment, Balancing].
13. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 678 (1887) (Field, J., dissenting). The judicial quest to
establish this "line of confiscation," has been characterized as "the most haunting jurisprudential
problem in the field of contemporary land-use law . . . one that may be the lawyer's equivalent of
the physicist's hunt for the quark." C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1977).
14. The Takings Clause, therefore, preserves the governmental power to regulate, subject only to the dictates of "justice and fairness." There is no abstract or fixed point at
which judicial intervention under the Takings Clause becomes appropriate. Formulas
and factors have been developed in a variety of settings. Resolution of each case, however, ultimately calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the application of
logic.
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (citations omitted).
15. [T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any "set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the Government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. Indeed, we have frequently observed that whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the Government's failure to pay for any
losses proximately caused by it depends largely "upon the particular circumstances [in
that] case.''
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citations omitted).
16. A "set formula" is not available in part because the Court, as a matter of constitutional
policy, has avoided the establishment of general rules in this area.
In the realm of constitutional law, especially, this Court has perceived the embarrassment which is likely to result from an attempt to formulate rules or decide questions
beyond the necessities of the immediate issue. It has preferred to follow the method of a
gradual approach to the general by a systematically guarded application and extension
of constitutional principles to particular cases as they arise, rather than by out of hand
attempts to establish general rules to which future cases must be fitted.
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926).
17. Justice Holmes himself stated, "this is a question of degree-and therefore cannot be
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suiting ad hoc factual analysis has therefore been fragmented and confusing.18 The Court has adopted an unpredictable "factor" approach 19
without any clarification of the interaction of the individual factors and
without any indication of their respective importance. 20
This comment is a broad overview of the language, arguments and
decisions utilized by the United States Supreme Court 21 in its regulatory takings jurisprudence with regard to real property 22 regulations. 23
disposed of by general propositions." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 ( 1922).
18. See generally Berger, supra note 6, at 261; Bowden & Feldman, Take It or Leave It:
Uncertain Regulatory Taking Standards and Remedies Threaten California's Open Space Planning, 15 U.C.D. L. REv. 371, 375 (1981) [hereinafter Bowden]; Costonis, Presumptive and Per
Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L Rt:v. 465 (1983) [hereinafter
Costonis]; Hum bach, A Unifying Theory for the just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulations
and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L Rt:v. 243 (1982) [hereinafter Humbach]; Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. Rt:v. 1165, 1235-37 (1967) [hereinafter Michelman]; Sax, Takings, Private Property
and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J 149, 155-161 (1971) [hereinafter Sax]; Van Alstyne, supra note
2 at 1.
19. "Not since Justice Stewart announced his 'I know it when I see it' test of obscenity has
the United States Supreme Court cast a major body of law into greater rhaos than that now
plaguing the law of police power land use controls." Bowden, supra note 18, at 371. See also
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3164 (1987) (Stevens, J, dissenting)
("land-use planners [will] still be left guessing about how the Court will react to the next rase,
and the one after that.").
20. See e.g., Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (expressly adopting a factor approach); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 n.9 (1979)
("We do not decide, however, whether in some circumstances one of these factors by itself may be
dispositive."). See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 29.
21. While this comment will focus exclusively upon cases determined by the United States
Supreme Court, it should be remembered that state courts may interpret the Court's analysis
differently. "The dual jurisdiction possessed by state and federal courts in taking cases, and the
different analytical approach employed by each to determine a taking exacerbate this uncertainty:"
Bowden, supra note 18, at 37 5. It should also be remembered that each state's constitutional
provisions, or its judicial interpretation of its constitutional provisions, may be at odds with the
Supreme Court's analysis and should therefore be considered in addition to the Supreme Court
cases. See generally Comment, Zoning, supra note 4, at 1463, passim.
22. Even though the Federal Constitution is often the basis of the regulatory taking claim,
the determination of what constitutes property will be made based upon state law. "It is axiomatic, of course, that the state law is the source of those strands that constitute a property owner's
bundle of property rights. 'As a general proposition[,] the law of real property is, under our
Constitution, left to the individual States to develop and administer.' " Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 5153
(Brennan, j., dissenting). "Reliance on stale law is necessitated by the fact that '[p]roperty interests .
are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law'" Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1260 (1987) (Rehnquisl, j., dissenting) (citing Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161
(1980)). Cf Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1012 (1984) ("If Congress can 'pre-preempt' state property law in the manner advocated
then the Taking Clause has lost all
vitality.").
23. Because the case law in this area is relatively recent and limited, there would be little
advantage to reporting solely on the actual holdings of each case. One of the weaknesses of the
Court's multi-factored approach is determining what is dicta and what is the true holding of a
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Its goal is to remove some of the uncertainty and unpredictability by
cataloging the judicial formulations of the "unduly harsh impacts"
which may constitute a taking, and by addressing the pivotal issues
identified by the Court as being critical to the formation of a successful
regulatory taking claim. 24

II.

THE IMPACTs oF REGULATORY CoNFISCATION

The Court has stated that a regulation "goes too far," i.e., has an
unduly harsh impact, when it "becomes so onerous that it has the same
effect as an appropriation of the property through eminent domain or
physical possession. " 211 The critical issue in regulatory takings is the
impact upon the owner. If a regulation causes one of the unduly harsh
impacts outlined in this comment, it may be considered to be a regulatory confiscation requiring just compensation. These impacts are not
mutually exclusive, however, a single regulation may cause several
harsh regulatory impacts each of which may amount to a taking. 26
The unduly harsh impacts identified by the Court may be categorized into groups reflecting three factors the Court has identified as
having particular significance in its ad hoc inquiries; "the character of
the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with
reasonable investment backed expectations." 27 For ease of reference,
these groupings will be called forms of confiscation.
case. In order to better identify the regulatory impacts which the Court, in general, has identified
as being severe enough to constitute a taking when they occur, this comment freely utilizes the
dicta which is often found in each case, as well as language from concurring and dissenting opinions. Dissenting opinions may in fact have a greater degree of significance in the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence since the merits of the actual taking claims have seldom been addressed
in the majority opinion. Most claims have been dismissed as being facial challenges, see infra
notes 268-86 and accompanying text, or because of ripeness, see infra notes 233-67 and accompanying text.
24. In addition to the discussion of the merits of regulatory taking claims, this comment
includes three supplementary issues which require consideration in a regulatory taking case: 1) the
exceptions to the limitations of the Just Compensation Clause; whether a regulation abates a
nuisance or provides an average reciprocity of advantage, see infra notes 181-232 and accompanying text, 2) the ripeness issue; whether the government's actions are final and have inflicted a
concrete injury, see infra notes 233-67 and accompanying text, 3) the substantive due process
analysis; whether the regulation is valid notwithstanding its compensation ramifications, see infra
notes 267-345 and accompanying text. While each of these issues should be considered early in the
analysis of a potential taking claim, they will be discussed later so that their relative roles will be
more readily apparent.
25. Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 199 (1985).
26. See e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (the regulation took an
easement, caused a substantial diminution in value, and unduly interfered with a reasonable investment-backed expectation when it required marina owners to open the marina to the public).
27. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980). These three principle
factors were first identified by the Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (challenge to New York City's landmark preservation law).
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While it will be apparent that the relevant factors of each form of
confiscation may overlap, 28 this comment will show that the impacts are
separate and distinct. Although the finding of any one impact may be
dispositive of the taking claim, practitioners would be wise, because of
the uncertainty surrounding the regulatory takings law, to try allege as
many harsh impacts under a given regulation as possible, as well as to
try formulate new impacts which concur with those identified herein. 29
A.

Confiscation by Acquisition

Because of its similarity to physical invasions, the easiest form of
confiscation to prove occurs when a regulation has effectively acquired
private property for public purposes. 30 When a regulation prevents the
owner from exercising dominion over his property in a traditional manner-i.e., it effectively prevents the owner from exercising his right to
possess, use and dispose of his property, 31 it may be "characterized" as
an appropriation of property for a governmental purpose. 32 The gov28. Each impact may involve certain factors which are also involved in other impacts. For
example, all regulation will have some economic effect upon the property owner. A "physical
occupation" may reduce market value. An "undue interference with an investment-backed expectation" may also reduce the value of the property or cause economic losses of wasted efforts and
expenses. The economic effect of a regulation, however, has not been critical in the Court's analysis of physical occupation and investment-backed expectation analysis. A diminution in value is
merely an incidental fact as to these impacts, but, it is a vital fact when considering an economic
appropriation.
The interrelationship of the various facts in a given situation is particularly confusing when
more than one form of confiscation may be alleged. In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 179-180 (1979), for example, the challenged regulation: 1) interfered with the investmentbacked expectations of the property owner, 2) caused a substantial diminution in value, and 3)
imposed an easement by creating a public right of access. The Court found a taking, but did not
give any indication as to whether one of the injuries alone would constitute a taking. See id. at 178
n.9. Cf Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (the regulation did not reach
the level of confiscation in any of the areas) (see infra notes 66-70).
29. Cf Pennell v. City of San Jose, 56 U.S.L.W. 4168 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1988) (the most recent
takings case, identifying private funding of social reform as a possible new formulation of a regulatory taking impact) (See infra notes 130-43 and accompanying text).
30. Cf Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citations omitted):
A "taking" may more readily be found when the interference with a property ran be
characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.
31. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (property is "the
group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use
and dispose of it.").
32. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 135. The Court's requirement that the appropriation of
resources be for some "strictly governmental purpose" reflects the Takings Clause requirement
that the taking be for a "public use." See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S.
Ct. 1232, 1256 (1987) ("The existence of such a public purpose is merely a prerequisite to the
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ernment, rather than the individual, acquires and exercises rights of
dominion over the property as if it were its own property. 33 There is no
debate that if a government physically invades and occupies private
property, it has increased its "assets" at the expense of the individual in
contravention of the Takings Clause. 34 When a regulation has an impact upon a property owner similar to the impact of a physical
seizure, 35 the regulation may be considered an appropriation. 36 The
government has enhanced its "assets" by effectively acquiring dominion
over the property even though it has not formally acquired title. 37 Such
government's exercise of its taking power.") (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Hawaii Housing
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-243, 245 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33
(1954)). The requirement, however, is redundant when addressing regulatory taking claims since
a necessary due process prerequisite for the enactment of any regulation is that it be for the benefit
of the public. See infra notes 300-314 and accompanying text. Therefore, even if the government
does not use the property directly, the property has nevertheless been appropriated for the governmental purpose of promoting the health safety and welfare of the public.
Compare San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 n.18 (1981) (4-1-4
plurality opinion) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the city's objective was 'to have the property remain
unused, undisturbed and in its natural state so open space and scenic vistas may be preserved. In
this sense the property is being 'used' by the public .
.' ") with Penn Central, 438 at 135
(there is no appropriation unless the regulation "exploits" the property for governmental purposes
or "facilitates [or] arises from any entrepreneurial operations of the city."),
33. When the government steps out of its role as a neutral arbiter engaged principally
in "defining standards to reconcile differences among the private interests in the community," and instead acts in an enterprise capacity seeking the "enhancement of its
resource position," the use of the regulatory power is more readily seen by the judicial
eye to constitute a compensable "taking" than a non-compensable "regulation."
Van Alstyne, supra note 18, at 24 (quoting Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36,
63 (1964))
34. E.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (13 Wall. 1871) ("where real estate
is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having
any artificial structures placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a
taking, within the meaning of the Constitution."). Compare United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 165-66 (1958) (taking claim denied because "the Government did not
occupy, use, or in any manner take physical possession of the gold mines or of the equipment
connected with them"); with United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1962) (government
occupation of mines was a compensable taking).
35. One of the principle distinctions between a simple physical invasion and a regulatory
physical invasion is that the latter case results in the invalidation of the regulation authorizing the
invasion, thereby requiring the invasion to cease. The property owner is therefore able to effectively enjoin the invasion which he would not be able to do were it a simple physical invasion. See
infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
36. It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result if . . it shall be held that if
the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the
public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to
any extent, can, in effect, subject it to total destruction without making any compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use.
Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 177-78 quoted with approval in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (1987) (emphasis found in First English).
37. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 96 (1931) ("Confiscation may result from a taking of the use of property without compensation quite as well as
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regulations do not "merely adjust the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good. Rather, [they are] a forced contribution to general governmental revenues." 38
There are three methods by which a regulation may acquire private property. First, a regulation may cause a "permanent physical occupation."39 Second, a regulation may appropriate an easement by subjecting private property to a "public right of access." 40 Third, a
regulation may acquire property by destroying the "beneficial ownership" of that property. 41

1.

Impact: permanent physical occupation

A physical seizure of property is not necessary to effect an appropriation of private property, 42 but when the impact of a regulation is a
"permanent physical occupation," 43 the Court has willingly 44 held it to
be a per se taking requiring compensation.•~~ A permanent physical invasion appropriates the occupied space by excluding all others, including the owner. "6
The leading case concerning a physical invasion caused by a regufrom the taking of title.") cited with approval in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174
n.8. (I 979).
38. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980) (citing Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
39. Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982). See infra
notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
40. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979). See infra notes 53-70 and
accompanying text.
41. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,262 (1946). See infra notes 71-103 and accompanying text.
42. While the term "taken" might have been narrowly interpreted to include only physical seizures of property rights, "the construction of the phrase has not been so narrow.
The courts have held that the deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion
of a right or interest to the sovereign constitutes a taking."
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 143 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. General
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
43. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421.
44. The Court has been more willing to hold that physical invasions require compensation
because "[s]uch an appropriation is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner's property interests." Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435. They are also "relatively rare, and easily identifiable
without making any economic analysis." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, I 07 S. Ct. 2378, 2393 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Loretto, 458 U.S. at
437 ("whether a permanent physical occupation has occurred presents relatively few problems of
proof").
45. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421. See generally Costonis, supra note 18.
46. See St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1893) ("[T]he use
made by the telegraph company is, in respect to so much of the space as it occupies with its poles,
permanent and exclusive. It as effectually and permanently dispossesses the general publir as if it
had destroyed that amount of ground.") quoted with approval in Loretto, 458 U.S. at 429.
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lation is Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp ..-n The Supreme Court held unconstitutional a New York regulation requiring
landlords to permit48 a private cable TV company to attach its cable
facilities to all rental property because it resulted in a permanent physical occupation. The Supreme Court ignored its traditional factor approach and applied a per se physical invasion rule to the regulation. 49
We have long considered a physical intrusion by government to be a
property restriction of an unusually serious character for purposes of
the Takings Clause. Our cases further establish that when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has occurred. In such a case, "the character of the
government action" not only is an important factor in resolving
whether the action works a taking but also is determinative.~ 0

When property has been permanently physically occupied, the impact of the regulation is unusually harsh in that "the government does
not simply take a single 'strand' from the bundle of property rights: it
chops through the whole bundle, taking a slice of every strand." 111 In
essence, a permanent physical occupation "appropriates" the invaded
space by depriving the owner of every fundamental property right~
associated with the space except for the right of title.
2

47. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
48. "This element of required acquiesence is at the heart of the concept of occupation."
F.C.C. v. Florida Power Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1107, 1112 (1987) (upholding F.C.C. regulation of
rates charged by utilities to cable television companies for use of utility poles).
49. The New York Court of Appeals had utilized the "factor" analysis indicated in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), and upheld the regulation
because it did not have an excessive economic impact upon the property owner when measured
against the landlord's aggregate property. nor did it interfere with any reasonable investmentbacked expectations. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 423
N.E.2d 320 (1981). In overruling the New York court, the Supreme Court explained that the
Penn Central "opinion does not repudiate the rule that a permanent physical occupation is a
government action of such a unique character that it is a taking without regard to other factors
that a court might ordinarily examine." Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 432 (1982)
50. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 (emphasis added). The Court did not even consider the severity
of the invasion. "[C]onstitutional protection for the rights of private property cannot be made to
depend on the size of the area permanently occupied. If the wire would have been a huge cable,
several inches thick . . there would have been a difference in degree, but not in principle." /d. at
437 & n. 13. "[W]hether the installation is a taking does not depend on whether the volume of
space it occupies is bigger than a breadbox." /d. at 438 n.15
51. /d. at 435-36 (a physical invasion deprives the owner of the right to possess, the right to
exclude others from, the right to use, and the right to dispose of, the occupied space).
52. Cf Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) ("where an owner possesses a full
"bundle" of property rights, the destruction of one "strand" of the bundle is not a taking, because
the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.") (citations omitted; emphasis added).
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Impact: imposition of an easement

In Loretto the physical intrusion was particulary offensive because
the government allowed one private party to intrude upon the premises
of another private party. 113 An invasion by a "stranger" causes an
owner to suffer "a special kind of injury." 114 When a regulation permits
"strangers" to repeatedly enter upon private property, 1111 the Court has
held that the government has appropriated an easement or servitude for
which it must pay just compensation. 116 The impact of such a regulation
is that the government acquires the owner's right to exclude others because the government, not the individual now determines who may and
who may not enter upon the property.
The leading case on the regulatory taking of an easement is Kaiser
Aetna v. United States. 117 The private owner of a shallow lagoon on the
island of Oahu, Hawaii spent millions of dollars to dredge and develop
the pond into a private marina. After completion of the initial phases of
the marina, the Army Corps of Engineers insisted that prior to further
development of the marina the owner would be required to grant public
access to the marina since it had now become "navigable waters" by
means of the improvements. 118 Rejecting the government's argument
that the owner voluntarily surrendered its right to exclude others, 119 the
53. The City of New York put great emphasis on the fact that Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), referred to a physical invasion "by government," and
argued that the same rule did not apply when a physical invasion was made by a private party.
The Court disagreed, stating, "A permanent physical occupation authorized by state law is a
taking without regard to whether the State, or instead a party authorized by the state, is the
occupant." Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432 n.9.
54. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436 (citing Michelman, supra note 18, at 1228 & n.110):
[P]roperty law has long protected an owner's expectation that he will be relatively
undisturbed at least in the possession of his property. To require, as well, that the
owner permit another to exercise complete dominion literally adds insult to injury. Furthermore, such an occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use
of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the
owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion.
55. "Such repeated trespasses, unlike isolated trespasses, would deprive the owner of the
history of exclusivity which is the factual predicate for legal actions to redress future incursions,
analogously to situations where private easements are acquired by prescription." Humbach, supra
note 18, at 265.
56. "Property is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are made upon an owner's
use of it to an extent that, as between private parties, a servitude has been acquired either by
agreement or in course of time." United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947).
57. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
58. The Court affirmed the lower court holding that the waters were "navigable waters" and
therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the Corps, but pointed out that "this Court has never held
that the navigational servitude creates a blanket exception to the Takings Clause." !d. at 172.
59. The Government argued that by connecting the marina with the navigable bay, "the
owner ha[d] [voluntarily] lost one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property-the right to exclude others." /d. at 176. Cf Ruckleshaus v.
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Court held that "[i ]n this case, . . . the 'right to exclude,' so universally
held to be a fundamental element of the property right,jalls within this
category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation. " 60 Unless Congress was willing to pay for the property owner's
"fundamental right" to exclude others, the developer retained the right
to exclude the public. 61 "[E]ven if the Government physically invades
only an easement m property, it must nonetheless pay just
compensation. " 62
The Court recently indicated in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 63 that if the easement is permanent, and requires the
property owner to permit continuous access to the property, then the
impact is the same as a per se taking under the "permanent physical
occupation" test found in Loretto. 64
We think that a "permanent physical occupation" has occurred, for
purposes of that rule, where individuals are given a permanent and
continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may
continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual IS
permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises. 65

Easements, however, may have a limited impact if they grant the
owner some control over when and how his property may be invaded.
Such limited easements are not takings if the government rebuts the
presumption that the taking of the right to exclude is unduly severe
Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (the voluntary application for a government permit involving
chemicals, with notice that the contents and procedures involved would become public, waived any
claim to "trade secret" rights).
60. Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 179-80 (emphasis added).
61. Cf Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145 (1987) (citations omitted). See infra note 64.
62. Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 180.
63. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987)
64. See generally id. at 3145 (citations omitted);
Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to
the beach, rather than conditioning their permit to rebuild their house on their agreeing
to do so, we have no doubt there would have been a taking. To say that the appropriation of a public easement across a landowner's premises does not constitute a taking of
the property interest but rather, (as Justice Brennan contends) "a mere restriction on
its use," is to use words in a manner that deprives them of all their ordinary meaning.
Indeed, one of the principle uses of the eminent domain power is to assure that the
government be able to require conveyance of just such interests, so long as it pays for
them.
We have repeatedly held that, as to property reserved by its owner for
private use, "the right to exclude [others is] 'one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property'."
65. /d. The Court, however, did not invalidate the regulation because it took a permanent
easement from the Nollans, rather, it invalidated t!.e regulation because it was a deprivation of
property without due process. See infra notes 338-45 and accompanying text.
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upon the property owner, as was the case in Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins. 66 The Pruneyard easement did not qualify for the
per se approach presented in Nollan because the easement did not require the property owner to grant permanent, continuous access. 67 The
Court held that the easement's impact upon the property owner's control was not severe enough to constitute an appropriation of property
when considered alone. 68 Because the easement was limited and did not
amount to an appropriation of control, the Court considered the other
possible forms of confiscation. The easement did not have a harsh economic impact, 69 and did not interfere with the property owner's investment-backed expectations, 70 therefore the regulation, i.e., the court order, was upheld.
The more a regulatory easement restricts an owner's control and
requires continuous access to his property, the more likely the impact
will be considered a "taking" under the permanent physical occupation
rule given in Loretto. Limited easements, on the other hand, such as
the easement imposed in Pruneyard, may not qualify for the per se
rule, but, they do carry the strong presumption found in Kaiser Aetna
that the imposition of an easement is an unduly harsh impact. The
presumption may be rebutted, however, if the government can prove
66. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). In Pruneyard, high school students attempted to distribute pamphlets and circulate petitions within the common areas of the Pruneyard Shopping Center. This
was contrary to the Center's policy of not permitting any tenant or visitor to engage in any publicly expressive activity. The Shopping Center's security guard suggested that they move outside to
the public sidewalk. The students promptly left and later sought an injunction against the Center
to enjoin it from denying them access based on their constitutional right of free speech under the
California Constitution. The Center's owner alleged that it would be a "taking" of his property to
force him to permit the students access.
67. See Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145 n.1 ("The holding of [Pruneyardj, is not inconsistent
with this analysis, since there the owner had already opened his property to the general public,
and in addition, permanent access was not required.") (emphasis added; citations omitted).
68. The Court held that,
there has literally been a taking of that right [to exclude] ... But, it is well established
that 'not every destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been held
to be a 'taking' in the constitutional sense.' ... The decision of the California Supreme
Court makes it clear that the Pruneyard may restrict expressive activity by adopting
time, place, and manner regulations that will minimize any interference with its commercial functions .... In these circumstances, the fact that they may have 'physically
invaded' appellant's property cannot be viewed as determinative.
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-84 (1980) (citations omitted).
69. The property owner "failed to demonstrate that the 'right to exclude others' is ... essential to the use or economic value of the property." !d. at 84.
70. The owner expected the shopping complex to be "open to the public at large." /d. at 8384. The Court distinguished the limited easement at issue in Pruneyard from the continuous
access easement in Kaiser Aetna by distinguishing the expectations of the property owners in each
case. The marina in Kaiser Aetna was always intended to be private, while the shopping Center
in Pruneyard was intended, by its nature, to be public. See infra notes 152-59 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the investment-backed expectation in each case.
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that the partial destruction of the fundamental right of exclusion did
not have a significant impact upon the property owner.

3. Impact: intrusions short of physical mvaswn- the destruction of
all beneficial use
A regulation which causes an intrusion short of physical invasion 71
may still be "characterized as a physical taking" 72 if its impact is the
destruction of the property owner's beneficial use and enjoyment of his
property. 73 If most or all beneficial use 74 has been appropriated or destroyed75 by a regulation so as to make the property "wholly useless," 76
71. "Governmental action short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter, to
amount to a taking." United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (citing
United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 (1910); Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S.
546 (1914)).
72. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (emphasis added). While a claim that a regulation deprives the owner of all beneficial use does not have
the same presumptive advantages as do claims based upon a physical invasion, it nevertheless has
a higher probability of success than does a claim based merely upon economic impact. See supra
note 30.
73. "[A]llthat is beneficial in property is the use and enjoyment of it; the use is the property,
and if that is taken away, it matters not that the empty husks of title and possession are left with
him wbo was once the owner." Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 652 ( 1887) (Mr. Choate's argument for Ziebold; Brief for the Appellant).
74. See e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S.
Ct. 2378, 2388 (1987) ("'temporary' takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his
property, are not different in kind from permanent takings.") (emphasis added, citations omitted);
Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) (a final decision is needed to
"tell whether the land retain[s] any reasonable beneficial use"); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (it is a taking "where the effects completely deprives the owner of all, or most of his interest in the property.") (emphasis added); Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 137 ("it is not literally accurate to say that they have been denied all use of
[their] rights") (emphasis in original).
75. The government does not necessarily need to make use of the property in order to "take"
it. Destruction alone is a taking. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. In Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40 ( 1960), the destruction of materialman liens by the doctrine of sovereign immunity was a compensable taking.
Before the liens were destroyed, the leinholders admittedly had compensable property.
Immediately afterwards, they had none. This was not because their property vanished
into thin air. It was because the Government, for its own advantage destroyed the value
of the liens .
Since this acquisition was for a public use, however accomplished,
whether with an intent and purpose of extinguishing the liens or not, the Government's
action did destroy them and in the circumstances of this case did thereby take the property value of those liens within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
Jd. at 48-49. Cf United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (19S2) (new bankruptcy law was
not retroactive because retroactive application would "result in a complete destruction of the property right of the secured party" and thereby become an uncompensated taking).
76. [T]he police power may limit the height of buildings, in a city, without compensation.
But if it should attempt to limit the height so far as to make an ordinary
building lot wholly useless, the rights of property would prevail over the other public
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the regulation is unconstitutional. 77 The reason being that the regula-•
tion's impact upon the property owner78 is comparable to the impact
caused by a formal condemnation or physical invasion. 79
The Court invalidated a governmental regulation because it destroyed the "essential use" of the property in Curtin v. Benson. 80 The
Court therein invalidated an order by the Superintendent of Yosemite
National Park which prevented a property owner from herding his
stock to his property located within the park boundaries. 81 The Superintendent claimed to be exercising the powers of a sovereign over the
Park. Accepting the Superintendent's power of sovereignty, arguendo,
the Court held that the power could not be used to "destroy essential
uses of private property." 82 The Superintendent's order prevented the
grazing of cattle which was the only use to be made of the property and
therefore was not a regulation of the use of the land, but "an absolute
prohibition of use. " 83
interest, and the police power would fail. To set such a limit would need compensation
and the power of eminent domain.
Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (emphasis added).
77. The modern prevailing view is that any substantial interference with private property . . by which the owner's right to use or enjoyment is in any substantial degree
abridged or destroyed, is in fact, and in law, a "taking" in the constitutional sense, to
the extent of the damages suffered, even though the title and possession of the owner
remains undisturbed.
2 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.09 (3rd rev. ed. 1975).
78. The Court has stated that the impact upon an owner "is resolved by focusing on the uses
the regulation permit[s]," Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131, rather than by focusing on whether "the
regulation deprives the property owner the most profitable use of his property," United States v.
Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (citations omitted). See also Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) ("It is, to be sure, undeniable that the regulations here prevent the
most profitable use of appellees' property. Again, however, that is not dispositive."). It is, however,
unlikely that a regulation could ever destroy all beneficial use.
[H]ere enjoyment and use of the land are not completely destroyed. But that does not
seem to us to be controlling. The path of glide for airplanes might reduce a valuable
factory site to grazing land, an orchard to a vegetable patch, a residential section to a
wheat field. Some value would remain.
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1946) referred to in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
262 (1980) (referring to Causby as a prevention of "the best use of appellant's land").
79. See infra note 92.
80. 222 U.S. 78 (1911). Cf Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125-27, 138 (rejecting the formulation that the regulation was a taking because it prohibited "the most beneficial use of the property," holding instead that the regulation "permit[ted] reasonable beneficial use of the landmark
site").
81. The Park Superintendent refused to allow Senator Curtin to graze his cattle upon his
own property within the Park boundaries because he had not complied with rules imposed by the
Superintendent regarding the herding of stock over the Government lands. Curtin, 222 U.S. at 83.
82. !d. at 86.
83. !d. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S.
264, 296 (1981) ("the Act does not categorically prohibit surface coal mining; it merely regulates
the conditions under which such operations may be conducted."). This distinction, however, may
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It [was] not a prevention of a misuse or illegal use but the prevention
of a legal and essential use, an attribute of its ownership, one which
goes to make up its essence and value. To take it away is practically
to take his property away, and to do that is beyond the power even of
sovereignty, except by proper proceedings to that end. 84

The best analysis and statement of the "intrusion short of physical
invasion" impact is actually found in a non-regulatory case. In United
States v. Causby, 811 the Court held that the Government's physical action86 "took" an "easement of flight," 87 over the property, but that the
taking of the easement was also a taking of the surface because the use
of the easement "would be a definite exercise of complete dominion
over the surface of the land." 88 The Court held that it was immaterial
that the planes never physically "touched" the property ,89 because "the
flight of airplanes, which skim the surface but do not touch it, is as
much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional
entry upon it." 90
The clearest statement as to why the destruction of beneficial use
is an unconstitutional impact comes from Justice Brennan's dissent in
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego. 91
serve little purpose since "every regulation necessarily speaks as a prohibition." Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962).
84. Curtin, 222 U.S. at 86 cited in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 145 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
85. 328 U.S. 256 (1946) cited with approval in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 128.
86. The government had leased an airport near the property owner. The safe path of glide to
one of the runways passed directly over the landowner's property at 83 feet. The landowners had
been operating a chicken farm on their property, but because the noise and bright lights from the
frequent landings frightened the chickens into flying into the walls, which killed them, any use of
the property as a commercial chicken farm was destroyed.
87. Causby, 328 U.S. at 261.
88. /d. at 262. See also id. at 261 ("If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights,
respondents could not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete. It would be as
complete as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive
possession of it.").
89. The fact that the planes never touched the surface would be as irrelevant as the absence
in this day of the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer of real estate. The owner's right to possess
and exploit the land~that is to say, his beneficial ownership of it~would be destroyed.
[Tjhe land is appropriated as directly and completely as if it were used for the runways
themselves.
/d. at 262.
90. /d. at 264. Comparing the overflights to a hypothetical elevated railway, the Court explained that despite the lack of physical contact, the elevated railway would be a taking because
"there would be an intrusion so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to limit his exploitation of it." /d. at 265.
91. 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (4-1-4 plurality opinion) The merits of the taking claim against San
Diego's open space zoning plan were not reached due to a lack of Supreme Court jurisdiction
resulting from the absence of a final state court decision. Justice Rehnquist, the swing vote, joined
with the judgment that jurisdiction was lacking in order to form a plurality, but agreed in princi-
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Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other landuse restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order to promote the public good just as effectively as formal condemnation or physical invasion of property. From the property owner's
point of view, it may matter little whether his land is condemned or
flooded, or whether it is restricted by regulation to use in its natural
state, if the effect in both cases is to deprive him of all beneficial use
of it. ... It is only logical, then, that governmental action other than
acquisition of title, occupancy, or physical invasion can be a "taking,"
and therefore a de facto exercise of the power of eminent domain,
where the effects completely deprive the owner of all or most of his
interest in the property. 92

With the exception of Curtin, the Court has done little more than give
lip service to this impact. 93 It is factually difficult to prove that all beneficial use has been destroyed. 9 " The Court has had the opportunity to
ple with the dissent that on the merits the impact of the regulation was a taking.
92. /d. at 652-53 (citing United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745,748 (1947); United States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
93. Land has value because the use of land has value. Any event which impairs the
usefulness or potential of a piece of land will, almost certainly, impair its value as well.
This relationship between usefulness and value makes it appear that there is a fundamental inconsistency in the law of just compensation. The law purports to relieve completely against the value losses resulting from certain governmental acts, such as physical intrusions and interferences, and not at all with respect to others, most particularly,
regulations of use.
Humbach, supra note 18, at 251-52. Compare Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419,430 (1982) ("[P]ermanent occupations of land . . . are takings even if they occupy
only relatively insubstantial amounts of space and do not seriously interfere with the landowner's
use of the rest of his land.") with Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130
(1978) (refusing to consider a regulation's impact upon discrete physical "segments" of property).
94. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1946). See supra note 78 and accompanying
text. The lack of a Court decision based upon this test may be due to the fact that the Court has
yet to encounter a factual situation like Causby in a regulatory setting. A hypothetical may assist
in understanding how a government can destroy all beneficial use through regulation.
A desert city wishes to improve the quality of its water system. It enacts a regulation which
prohibits development of any kind within one hundred feet of its major water canals, essentially
restricting the regulated property to its natural state.
Property owners of vacant residential lots along the canal retain title to, and maintain possession of, and have the right to dispose of their properties. Their use of the property within the nondevelopment zone, however, has been restricted to such uses as may be made in its natural state,
which are few if any at all. In effect, the city has confiscated the adjoining property in order to
expand the width of the canal zone. The city is using the restricted land as part of its water
system. The only substantive difference between the widening of the canal zone by regulation and
a widening of the zone by formal condemnation is that the former action avoided the payment of
just compensation to the property owners.
"Justice and fairness" dictate that the public as a whole bear the burden of the improved
water system since the public as a whole receives the benefit. Unless compensation is required,
thereby spreading the cost of the improvement to the public, the adjoining property owners will be
forced to bear the public's burden alone.
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recognize the taking of some beneficial use, but as of yet, 96 has refused
to recognize a partial taking of beneficial use as being an unduly harsh
impact.
The argument was made in Andrus v. Allard, 96 a personal property case, that a federal regulation prohibiting the sale of avian artifacts, such as eagle feathers and claws, prohibited the property owners
from making a profit from artifacts legally in their possession. The
property owners contended that the impact of the regulation was the
destruction of their theoretical right to dispose of their property for
profit. 97 The Court refused to recognize the partial taking, stating that
"the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to
a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full bundle of property
rights, the destruction of one "strand" of the bundle is not a taking,
because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." 98
With regard to partial takings in a physical sense, the Court stated
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 99 that
" '[ t ]aking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. This Court focuses rather . . . on
the extent of the interference with the rights in the property as a whole
10
. . . ."
° Contrary to its statement, the Court in Penn Central then
proceeded to consider the regulation's impact upon three discrete segments of the property; the Terminal itself, 101 the air rights above the
terminal within the height of their proposed building/ 02 and the air
95. The possibility of a partial taking remains open since the cases presented to the Court,
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1232 (1987) (alleged partial
taking by requiring some coal to be left in the ground), and Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979)
(alleged partial taking by destroying the right to make a profit), were facial challenges which bear
a different burden of proof than does an "as applied" takings claim. See infra notes 268-86 and
accompanying text. Cf Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (rejecting the
contention of the property owner "that the ordinance attempts to restrict and control the lawful
uses of appellee's land so as to confiscate and destroy a great part of its value," thereby taking part
of the economic value from the property owner reflected by a diminution in market value).
96. 444 U.S 51 (1979).
97. !d. at 64.
98. /d. at 65-66 (citations omitted). Cf Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1250-51 (characterizing a
"support estate" as a property right rather than a separate interest in land and refusing to recognize its taking as a compensable taking because it was only a partial taking of the owner's rights).
99. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
100. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. See also Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1248-50 (refusing, in a
facial challenge, to consider separately the coal required to be left in the ground from the rest of
the coal mined).
101. "[T]he New York City law does not interfere in any way with the present uses of the
TerminaL" Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
102. "Appellants, moreover, exaggerate the effect of the law on their ability to make use of
the air rights above the Terminal . . . Since appellants have not sought approval for the con-
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rights above the height of their proposed building, 103 and held that
there was no unduly harsh impact to any of the segments.
Since it has proven so difficult to prove a destruction of all beneficial use, and since so few regulations cause a physical invasion, the
Court has indicated a willingness to look at the economic impact of a
regulation.

B.

Confiscation by Economic Impact

Much of the confusion and uncertainty in the Court's regulatory
taking jurisprudence arises in its attempts to formulate an "unduly
harsh economic impact" test. 104 One reason the law is so unsettled in
this area is that in the 65 years since the Court first found a taking
based on economic impact in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 105 the
Court has never invalidated a regulation based solely on its economic
impact/ 06 even though it has referred to it as one factor which has
"particular significance" upon the Court's decisions. 107 A regulation
may cause an immediate economic harm 108 to the property owner severe enough to constitute a taking in two possible ways. The first is
that a regulation has deprived a property owner of all economically
struction of a smaller structure, we do not know that appellants will be denied any use of any
portion of the airspace above the Terminal." ld. at 136-37.
I 03. [T]o the extent appellants have been denied the right to build above the Terminal,
it is not literally accurate to say that they have been denied all use of even those preexisting air rights. Their ability to use these rights has not been abrogated; they are
made transferable to at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of
which have been found suitable for the construction of new office buildings.
/d. at 137.
104. Jd. at 127.
The question of what constitutes a "taking" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has
proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty. While this Court has recognized that
the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee [is] designed to bar the government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole," this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop
any "set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the Government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.
/d. at 123-24 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
105. 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (the Kohler Act made it "commercially impracticable to mine
certain coal").
106. See e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (economir impact played a
key role in the Court's analysis but it was not the sole basis upon which the Court found a
taking); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (the government's invasion did
not have sufficient economic impact upon the owner to amount to an uncompensated taking).
107. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
108. As will be discussed below, the Court has treated the possibility of future economic
harm, such as the loss of future profits, under the investment-backed expectation analysis rather
than under its economic impact analysis. See infra notes 163-71 and accompanying text.
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viable use of his property, and the second is that the regulation forces
individual property owners to privately fund social reform.

1.

Impact: deprivation of all economically viable use

In Agins v. Tiburon/ 09 the Court identified the denial of "economically viable use" as one form of "regulatory taking." 110 If the impact of a regulation is to make it "commercially impracticable" 111 to
use "certain" 112 property, it has "very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it." 113 The Court has
narrowly interpreted this economic impact.
Facial challenges that a regulation deprives an owner of all economically viable use have been uniformly unsuccessful. 114 If on its face
a regulation would permit any economic exploitation of the regulated
property, the mere enactment of the regulation is not an unduly harsh
impact. 111' In order for a property owner to successfully claim an economic taking, therefore, he must offer evidence as to the economic Impact of the regulation upon his particular piece of property. 116
109. 447 u.s. 255 (1980).
110. ld. at 260 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n.36).
111. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,414 (1922). Compare with Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1247-48 (1987) (no evidence in the
facial challenge that any mine had been unprofitable).
112. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414. The issue remains unsettled as to whether the
economic viability test applies only to the impact upon the regulated property or to the impact
upon the property owner's aggregate property. This issue was raised in the briefs of the parties in
Keystone, I 07 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). The Respondent contended that the coal companies were required to make "allegations of financial ruin, impending bankruptcy or . . . short term losses."
See Brief for the Respondent at 34. The Appellant indicated the fallacy of respondent's contention.
"Under respondent's reasoning, if General Motors owned 15 plants, Pennsylvania could simply
seize one of them without compensation and it would not be a taking because GM would still have
sizable holdings and still remain profitable." See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 4. The Court
provided no answer, stating that "petitioners have never claimed that their mining operations, or
Nor is there evidence that mining in any
even any specific mines, have been unprofttable .
specific location affected by the 50o/o rule has been unprofitable." Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1248.
113. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
114. See rases cited infra note 275.
115. There are two possible ways that a regulation may permit enough economic development to defeat a facial challenge. First, the regulation itself may permit limited development. E.g.,
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-263 (1980) (The California courts found "as a matter of
state law, that appellants may be permitted to build as many as five houses on their five acres of
prime residential property."). Second, there may be alternative economic uses not controlled by the
regulation. Sa also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 335 (1981) (Even if mining was completely
prohibited by the regulation, the "prime farmland provisions say nothing about alternative uses to
which prime farmland may be put .... We therefore conclude that these provisions do not, on
their face, deprive a property owner of economically beneficial use of his property.").
116. f,·.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 56 U.S.L.W. 4168, 4172 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1988) (A
facial takings challenge based upon the ground that "the ordinance deprives property owners of all
economically viable use of their land" is "easier to establish in an 'as applied' attack.").
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The most notable economic impact of regulations is that they often
reduce the market value of the plaintiffs property. 117 Diminution of
the market value of a particular parcel of property is a major factor in
determining whether the owner has been deprived of "all economically
viable use." The role of diminution, 118 however, has not been settled by
the Court. In some cases, the Court refers to it as a dispositive impact, 119 in other cases, it is referred to only as a factor. 120
One area of certainty regarding diminution of value is that a regulation does not effect a taking simply because its impact is that some
diminution in the value of the affected property occurs. "Government
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law." 121 To require governments to compensate property owners for
every reduction in property value, no matter how insignificant, would
compel them to "regulate by purchase." 122 Compensation, therefore is
not required for every diminution in value caused by a regulation. 123
Diminution may amount to a taking, however, if the impact is
severe. "When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases
there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act." 124 To date the Court has refused to define the "magni117. E.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). For a discussion of the value
diminution in these cases, see infra note 125. But cf Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 139 ( 197B) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (diminution of property value caused by a
change in zoning is abstract since the initial value prior to the diminution is determined by a prior
regulation).
11 B. One role diminution does play is in the determination of compensation once a regulation
is held to be a taking. Cf United States v. Causby, 32B U.S. 256, 261 (1946) ("It is the owner's
loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of the value of the property taken. Market value
fairly determined is the normal measure of the recovery.") (citations omitted). Diminution may
also play a role in the substantive due process balancing test as an indicator of the harm caused to
an individual. See infra notes 315-30 and accompanying text. Cf Comment, Zoning, supra note
4, at 14B2.
It should be noted, however, that diminution in value should not play any role in a facial
challenge. Diminution reflects a regulation's impact upon particular property, which is immaterial
to the issue of whether "the mere enactment" of a regulation effects a taking. See generally infra
notes 26B-B6 and accompanying text. But cf. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1246 (the Court expected
evidence of diminution in a facial challenge).
119. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
120. See e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, lBO (1979) (The Court's entire
reference to diminution consisted of the following: "This is not a case in which the Government is
exercising its regulatory power in a manner that will cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioner's private property; ... ").
121. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
122. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
123. ld. at 66 ("When we review regulation, a reduction in the value of property is not
necessarily equated with a taking.")
124. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413, reaffirmed in dictum in Keystone Bituminous
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tude" at which time the impact upon the market value constitutes a
taking, and has instead treated diminution as only a factor to be
considered. 126
The appeal of diminution is that it provides a method of quantifying a regulation's economic impact. The unstated rationale behind
using diminution as a factor is that the market value reflects the market's collective analysis of the parcel's economic value, both present and
future. 126 Diminution, resulting from a regulation, is an objective indication of the severity of the regulation's impact. If a property's value is
reduced to a nominal sum because of a regulation, it indicates that the
market does not perceive the possibility of significant economic use of
the property while so restricted. 127 The market's analysis may accuCoal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1246 (1987) ("[P)etitioners have also failed to make
a showing of diminution of value sufficient to satisfy the test set out in Pennsylvania Coal . . .
.").See also Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1248 ("[O)ur test for regulatory taking requires us to compare
the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the property .
.");United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) ("[W)e have recognized that action in the form of regulation can so diminish the value of property as to constitute a
taking.") (citing United States v. Kansas City Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
125. The Court stated in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131 (citations omitted), that "the decisions sustaining other land-use regulations, ... uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in
property value, standing alone, can establish a taking." This dicta, however, fails to accurately
characterize the cases cited which were decided upon alternative grounds which preempted any
consideration of diminution.
In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the property owner claimed, in a facial
challenge, diminution from $10,000 per acre to only $2,500 per acre; a 75'7o reduction in value.
The Court expressly stated that it did not reach the issue of diminution.
What would be the effect of a restraint imposed by ... the ordinance ... upon the
value or marketability of the lands is neither disclosed by the bill nor by the evidence,
and we are afforded no basis, apart from mere speculation, upon which to rest a conclusion that it . . would have any appreciable effect upon those matters.
!d. at 397.
The property owner in Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), claimed a diminution
from $800,000, when used for brick-making purposes, to $60,000, for residential purposes. The
regulation, however, was exempt from the just compensation clause because of the nuisance exception. See infra notes 184-98 and accompanying text. The Court also pointed out that the landowner could extract the valuable clay and make the bricks elsewhere, implying that in fact there
was no diminution of the value of the land, only increased operating costs in the making of the
bricks. !d. at 411.
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), involved another nuisance regulation exempt
from the just compensation clause because it was a safety measure. The Court did not even consider the issue of just compensation because "there [was) no evidence in the present record which
even remotely suggests that prohibition of further mining will reduce the value of the lot in question." !d. at 594.
126. Cf United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) ("[market) value may reflect the
use to which the land could readily be converted, as well as the existing use.").
127. !d.
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rately reflect the true economic impact, when the regulation, on its face,
would permit economic development.
Using diminution as a factor permits courts, which are often illequipped to perform complex economic analysis, 128 to quantify the economic impact by adopting the market's evaluation of whether all economically viable use has been "taken." 129 The greater the diminution
in property value, the greater the probability that the economically viable use of the property has been taken.

2.

Impact: privately funded social reform

The economic viability test described above permits many economic burdens to slip through the cracks merely because the impact of
the regulation is not a complete taking of the whole property. The
claim may be made that the economic impact of a regulation effects a
taking without destroying all economic viability because it in effect
compels one to privately subsidize public reform of a social problem for
which he shares no responsibility. "[I]ndividuals may be seen as having
been treated solely as a means in a process of social engineering." 130
Landlords in the recent case of Pennell v. City of San Jose, 131
claimed that a San Jose rent control regulation which permitted a denial of a reasonable rent increase if it would create a financial hardship
for an individual tenant was an unconstitutional transfer of property.
The San Jose regulation permitted a rent increase exceeding eight percent in a given year only if a tenant does not object. If a tenant objects,
128. Cf Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51,66 (1979) ("Prediction of profitability is essentially a
matter of reasoned speculation that courts are not especially competent to perform.").
129. The question remains, however, as to the magnitude of diminution required in order to
find a "taking." It should be noted that it is unlikely that a regulation will ever render a parcel of
real property totally valueless, see Causby, 328 U.S. at 262, unless there is a permanent physical
occupation, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982)
("[E]ven though the owner may retain the bare legal right to dispose of the occupied space by
transfer or sale, the permanent occupation of that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the
right of any value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make use of the property.") (emphasis added).
Since real property is indestructible, and since no regulation is truly permanent, over-regulated land will always have a "speculative value," even if it is currently economically useless. Since
a property owner who purchases property also purchases the right to challenge any offensive
regulation, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3146 n.2 (1987), someone will
likely pay a relatively nominal amount with the expectation to challenge the regulation so that the
property may regain some or all of its former value. Speculative value may be substantial in
absolute dollars, but nevertheless be nominal in terms of the property's potential value. A parcel
worth $10,000, were it not for the regulation, would only have a speculative value in the hundreds
of dollars, but, the speculative value of a parcel with a potential value of $100,000,000 could still
be in the millions, even though the regulation renders it unusable for the present.
130. Comment, Zoning, supra note 4, at 1492.
131. 56 U.S.L.W. 4168 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1988).

99]

REGULATORY CONFISCATION

121

a mandatory hearing is held before the increase may be permitted. The
Hearing Officer may consider the economic hardship that the increase
would cause to an individual tenant. 132 If an Officer "determines that
the proposed increase constitutes an unreasonably severe financial or
economic burden on a particular tenant, he may order that the excess of
the increase which is subject to his consideration . . . be disallowed." 133
The plaintiffs claimed that any such reduction would violate the
Takings Clause by effectively transferring the landlord's property, i.e.,
the denied portion of a reasonable rent increase, to individual hardship
tenants.
The United States Supreme Court did not address the issue because it felt the facial challenge was premature. 134 It simply affirmed
the California Supreme Court's holding that the regulation was not a
facial taking. 135 Justice Scalia, however, argued in his dissent 136 that
132. A Mediation Hearing Officer considers seven factors in determining whether the proposed increase is "reasonable under the circumstance" including the potential hardship a rent
increase would cause to individual tenants.
Hardship to Tenants. In the case of a rent increase ... which exceeds the standard set
[in this ordinance] then with respect to such excess and whether or not to allow same to
be part of the increased allowed under this chapter, the hearing officer shall consider
the economic and financial hardship imposed on the present tenant or tenants of the
unit or units to which such increases apply. If, on balance, the hearing officer determines that the proposed increase constitutes an unreasonably severe financial or economic hardship on a particular tenant, he may order that the excess of the increase ...
be disallowed.
San Jose Municipal Ordinance 19696, § 5703.29 (emphasis added) quoted in Pennell, 56
U.S.L.W. at 4169.
133. !d.
134. See infra notes 280-86 and accompanying text.
135. The premise of the Court's refusal to reach the merits of the claim was that the facial
challenge was not ripe for adjudication because there was nothing in the record to indicate that the
provision had ever been applied. Pennell, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4170. (Traditionally, facial challenges
have always been considered ripe, see infra note 271) Even though the Court did not determine
whether the provision was a forced housing subsidy, it did present the plaintiffs' argument.
[T]he ordinance establishes the seven factors that a Hearing Officer is to take into
account in determining the reasonable rent increase. The first six of these factors are all
objective, and are related either to the landlords costs of providing an adequate rental
unit, or to the condition of the rental market. Application of the six standards results in
a rent that is "reasonable" by reference to what appellants' contend is the only legitimate purpose of rent control: the elimination of "excessive" rents . . . When the
Hearing Officer then takes into account hardship to a tenant ... and reduces the rent
below the objectively "reasonable" amount established by the first six factors, this additional reduction in rent increase constitutes a "taking." This taking is impermissible
because it does not serve the purpose of eliminating excessive rents-that objective has
already been accomplished by the first six factors-instead, it serves only the purpose of
providing assistance to "hardship tenants." In short, appellants contend, the additional
reduction of rent on grounds of hardship accomplishes a transfer of the landlord's property to individual hardship tenant; The ordinance forces private individuals to shoulder
the "public" burden of subsidizing their poor tenants' housing.
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the provision was an unconstitutional taking on its face. Rather than
taking a quantitative approach to the regulation's economic impact, he
focused on the qualitative impact.
Justice Scalia proposed that the harshness of the "economic" regulation be determined by considering the cause-and-effect relationship of
the regulatee to the social problem being regulated. Under his analysis,
if a regulation imposes an economic burden upon a property owner in
order to remedy a public problem which the property owner is not responsible for, nor uniquely benefitting from, it is an unduly harsh
impact. 137
Applying his analysis to the situation in Pennell, Justice Scalia
noted that the "hardship" provision is only applied to landlords who,
because the statute itself controls the rent, are not the cause of the market shortage, nor are they reaping unique benefits. 138 Once a reasonable rent has been determined, the landlord is "innocent" 139 of any
cause-and-effect relationship which would justify singling him out to
bear the burden of remedying the housing situation. 140
Id. at 4170.
136. It should be noted that as often is the case when a claim is characterized as unripe, or as
a facial challenge, the fact that Justice Scalia's analysis appears in the dissent does not necessarily
preclude the Court from adopting it in a future ripe case relating to a specific situation.
137. Traditional land-use regulations do not violate the just compensation clause, according
to Justice Scalia, because "the owner's use of the property is (or, but for the regulation, would be)
the source of the social problem, it cannot be said that he has been singled out unfairly .... The
proposed property would otherwise be the cause of the [problem]. The same cause-and-effect relationship is properly thought tojustify emergency price regulation." Pennell, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4173
(Scalia, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part). Even when the owners of the regulated commodities are not the direct cause of a market shortage, it is fair to single them out to relieve the
social problem since they are otherwise able to "reap unique profits" from the market's inefficiency. Id.
138. Once the Hearing Officer considers the first six objective factors, he has calculated a
reasonable rent increase. The landlord may no longer be considered a cause of high housing costs
since his increase would only permit a reasonable return. Nor is he receiving any high profits
which would justify the imposition of an economic burden. I d. at 417 3.
139. Cf Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (emphasis added):
The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a public
nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes
depreciated, is very different from taking property for public use, or from depriving a
person of his property without due process of law. In the one case, a nuisance only is
abated; in the other, uno.!fending property is taken away from an innocent owner.
140. [The] problem is no more caused or exploited by the landlords than it is by the
grocers who sell needy renters their food, or the department stores that sell them their
clothes, or the employers who pay them their wages, or the citizens of San Jose holding
the higher-paying jobs from which they are excluded.
Pennell, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4173 (Scalia, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part).
Cf Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 403 (1922) (argument for the
plaintiff):
In time of epidemic it is conceivable that a State might temporarily prohibit the hoarding of essential medicines and might require physicians and druggists to sell them at
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Justice Scalia characterized the San Jose regulation as a departure
from the traditional manner in which American government has dealt
with the problem of assisting "those who cannot pay reasonable prices
for privately-sold necessities;" 141 i.e., the distribution of funds collected
from the public at large through taxation.
[T]he fact that government acts through the landlord-tenant relationship does not magically transform general public welfare, which must
be supported by all the public, into mere "economic regulation,"
which can disproportionately burden particular individuals. Here the
City is not "regulating" rents in the relevant sense of preventing rents
that are excessive; rather, it is using the occasion of rent regulation
(accomplished by the rest of the Ordinance) to establish a welfare
program privately funded by those landlords who happen to have
"hardship" tenants." 142

While the concept of privately funded social reform underlies all
regulatory taking claims, the cause-and-effect analysis proposed by Justice Scalia may help in identifying "the unfairness of making one citizen pay, in some fashion other than taxes, to remedy a social problem
that is none of his creation." 143 The cause-and-effect analysis fills the
void left by the economic viability test as well as provide a theoretical
analysis which may assist in all other areas of regulatory takings
jurisprudence.

C.

Confiscation by Undue Interference with Reasonable Investmentbacked Expectations

In addition to the acquisition and economic forms of confiscation
described above, the Court has identified and recognized a third form of
confiscation. 144 If a regulation causes an "undue interference" ~ with
14

reasonable rates. Even at such time, the druggist could not be required to dispense his
medicines for nothing, or a baker his bread, and that though the people were dying or
starving for want of drugs and food.
141. Pennell, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4173 (Scalia, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part).
142. !d.
143. !d. at 4174.
144. The Court has not expressly explained the difference between its "economic impact"
analysis and its "investment-backed expectations" analysis, but the two have routinely been identified as separate and distinct claims. See e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
I 07 S. Ct. 1232, 1242 (1987) ("makes it impossible for petitioners to profitably engage in their
business, or that there has been an undue interference with their investment-backed expectations.") (emphasis added); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2573
(1986) (White, J., dissenting) ("Factual allegations of interference with reasonable investment
backed expectations and denial of all economically feasible use of the property are certainly sufficient.") (emphasis added); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 129 n.6
(1985) ("will prevent economically viable uses of the property or frustrate reasonable investment
backed expectations") (emphasis added); Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
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"distinct investment backed expectations," 146 it will be considered an
uncompensated taking. The Court has yet to give much guidance as to
what is a "distinct investment-backed expectation." 147 As a minimum it
requires that the expectation be "reasonable," 148 and that it reach the
level of being a "property" interest 149 rather than a mere expectation 1110
of economic gain. 1111 To date, the Court has only considered the impact
of interferences with the "right to exclude others," and the "right to
make a profit."

1.

Impact: the expectation of excluding others

The most protected expectation has been the expectation of being
able to exclude others from one's property.u2 In Kaiser Aetna v.
United States/ 53 the Court indicated that the consent of the Army
Corps of Engineers created "a number of expectancies embodied in the
concept of 'property,' -expectancies that, if sufficiently important, the
government must condemn and pay for before it takes over the manage(1985) ("factors of particular significance are the economic impact of the challenged action and the
extent to which it interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations.").
145. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1242.
146. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
147. In general, the format of this form of confiscation remains a true multi-factored approach, a sort of catch all approach considering all possible factors previously mentioned in order
to ensure fairness.
148. See e.g.,United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 129 (1985)
("frustrate reasonable investment backed expectations"); Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172, 191 (1985). One expectation which will never be considered reasonable is the expectation that one may use bis property as a nuisance. Cf Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 623,
passim (1887) (landowners do not have a right to use their property to injure others). See generally infra notes 184-98 and accompanying text.
149. "But not all economic interests are 'property rights'; only those economic advantages are
'rights' which have the law in back of them, and only when they are so recognized may the courts
compel others to forbear from interfering with tbem or to compensate for their invasion." United
States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945) quoted in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979).
150. In Sears v. Akron, 246 U.S. 242 (1918), tbe plaintiffs claimed that permission from the
city to incorporate and develop a water system was "an indefeasible property right to proceed with
[the] development." Id. at 250. The Court beld, however, that all they had was a mere expectation
of economic gain which meant tbat "the company had no property right" which could have been
appropriated by the city's action. ld. at 247.
151. "[T]his Court bas dismissed 'taking' challenges on tbe ground that, while the challenged
government action caused economic harm, it did not interfere with interests that were sufficiently
bound up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property' for Fifth
Amendment purposes." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25 (citations omitted).
152. The overlap between the different forms of confiscation is readily apparent here. The
right to exclude is protected under both the acquisition analysis, see supra notes 53-70 and accompanying text, and under the investment-backed expectation analysis.
153. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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ment of the land owner's property." 1114 The investment-backed expectation at issue was the right to exclude others from the marina. This
fundamental right would permit the owners to recover their development costs, and possibly make a profit, by charging their private customers an annual fee. 11111 Since the demand of the Corps that the marina
be made public would destroy, or greatly injure, their investmentbacked expectation, the impact of the order was an undue interference
and therefore a compensable taking.
The impact of the interference with the property owner's "right to
exclude others" in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins/ 116 however,
was not considered unduly harsh. The shopping center owner in
Pruneyard claimed that his right to exclude people from his shopping
mall had been taken by a court order requiring him to permit students
to distribute pamphlets and collect signatures on his property. 1117 Because the regulation did not have any notable economic impact/ 118 the
only real issue was interference with the property owner's expectation
of control. The Court held that the interference with the owner's expectations was not undue because the owner retained the power to regulate the "time, place and manner," of the invasion of his property. 1119
The impact of an interference need not be economic according to
the Court. In the recent case of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 160 Justice Brennan argued in his dissent that the impact of the
forced conveyance of an easement was not unduly harsh because the
Nollans did not have any reasonable expectation to exclude people from
walking along their beach; first, because the state constitution did not
give them the right to exclude others/ 61 and second, because any possible expectation of excluding others was destroyed by actual notice that
the right to exclude others would have to be forfeited in order to receive
154. /d. at 179.
155. /d. at 180.
156. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
15 7. See supra note 66.
158. The owner "failed to demonstrate that the 'right to exclude others' is so essential to the
use or economic value of their property that the state-authorized limitation of it amounted to a
'taking.'" Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 84.
159. /d. at 83.
160. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
161. Justice Brennan contended that in California, "the state Constitution explicitly states
that no one possessing 'frontage' of any 'navigable water in this State, shall be permitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required for a public purpose." /d. 3158-59
(citing CAL CoNST., art. X, § 4). His interpretation of California law, however, was deemed
erroneous by the Court. As Justice Scalia pointed out in the opinion of the Court, "the right of
way sought here is not . . . one to navigable water (from the street to the sea) but along it."
Nollan, 107 S.Ct. at 3145 (emphasis added).
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a building permit. 162 The Court rejected Justice Brennan's contentions
and recognized the Nollan's expectations as being reasonable. 163

2.

Impact: the expectation of profit

Another critical expectation addressed by the Court has been the
expectation of profit. According to the general statements of the Court,
if a regulation destroys the profitability of a parcel of property by making it "commercially impracticable" to use the land, it constitutes an
unduly harsh impact. 164
Profitability, however, is a "slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim." 1611 In Andrus v. Allard, 166 a personal property case, the
plaintiffs claimed that a federal regulation which prohibited the sale of
avian artifacts in their possession, e.g., eagle feathers or claws, had an
unduly harsh impact because it deprived them of the opportunity to
earn a profit from their personal property. The Court found that "the
denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a

162. Justice Brennan argued that the property owners, were clearly on notice when requesting a new development permit that a condition of approval would be a provision ensuring public
lateral access to the shore. Thus, they surely could have had no expectation that they could obtain
approval of their new development and exercise any right of exclusion afterward.
Nollan, 107 S.Ct. at 3159.
The Court held that Justice Brennan's reliance on Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986
(I 984) (the voluntary application for a government permit involving chemicals, with notice that
the contents and procedures involved would become public, waived any claim to "trade secret"
rights), was a "peculiar proposition that a unilateral claim of entitlement by the government can
alter property rights." Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146 n.2. The majority stated that, "the announcement that the application for (or granting of) the permit will entail the yielding of a property
interest cannot be regarded as establishing the voluntary 'exchange,' that we found to have occurred in Monsanto." Nollan, 107 S.Ct. at 3146 n.2 (citing Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007). Since a
unilateral claim of entitlement by the government may not alter property rights, see Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), the property owners had a reasonable expectation that they would be able to exclude others from their property, despite notice that a
surrender of property would be required for the permit.
The Court also indicated that even though the Nollans bought the property after the policy
was implemented, their rights, and expectations, were unaffected. If the Commission was unable
to deprive the prior owners of the easement without compensation, the commission was without
power to deprive the Nollans because the prior owners transferred their full property rights to the
Nollans. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146 n.2.
163. The Court did not invalidate the regulation based solely upon the finding that the regulation interfered with the investment-backed expectations of the Nollans. It instead found that the
regulation was a taking of property without due process. See infra notes 338-445 and accompanying text.
164. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922). But cf Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1247 (1987) (mining companies failed to
prove that the regulation made it "commercially impracticable for them to continue mining").
165. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
166. /d.
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taking." 167 The economic impact was not unduly harsh in the Court's
eyes because there remained a possibility that some of their economic
expectations could still be fulfilled. 168 The Court explained that the
"[p ]rediction of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned speculation that courts are not especially competent to perform. Further, perhaps because of its very uncertainty, the interest in anticipated gains
has traditionally been viewed as less compelling than other propertyrelated interests. " 169
Prior to the restrictive language in Andrus, the Court used the
existing profitability of the property in Penn Central as a justification
for not finding a "taking."
[T]he New York City law does not interfere in any way with the
present uses of the Terminal. ... So the law does not interfere with
what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel. More importantly, ... we must regard
the New York City law as permitting Penn Central not only to profit
from the Terminal but to obtain a "reasonable return" on its
investment. 170
In light of the language in Penn Central, if a parcel of property is
already returning a reasonable profit, a prohibition of further development may, in some situations, not be considered an undue interference,
despite an otherwise reasonable expectation of increasing future profits
by developing. The Penn Central Court's indication that present uses
are the "primary expectation" emphasizes the status quo and reduces
the likelihood that expectation of "future" exploitation and future profits will receive much protection under the investment-backed expectation analysis. 171 Since future profits are speculative, their destruction is
not necessarily an unduly harsh impact.
167. /d. at 65. It should be noted that although Andrus states that the prohibition of "the
most profitable use" may not amount to a taking, it does not state that the taking of all profitable
use may be permitted. Id. at 66.
168. "[I]t is not clear that appellees will be unable to derive economic benefit from the artifacts; for example, they might exhibit the artifacts for an admissions charge." ld. at 66.
169. /d. (citations omitted).
170. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978). Had the
owner's purchased the property with the expectation of expanding, the Court's finding may have
been otherwise. Cf Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (property owners bought
and developed the property with the reasonable expectation of making a profit by charging private
members an annual fee).
171. The reasonableness of the common expectation that one may develop one's land is still
undecided. In Penn Central, the Court stated that it was "untenable" that property owners could,
"establish a 'taking' simply by showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a property
interest that they heretofore had believed was available for development." Penn Central, 438 U.S.
at 130. But see Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3147 n.2 (property owners have an inherent right, and
therefore reasonable expectation, to build on one's land subject only to legitimate permitting
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Expectations viewed as vested rights

Perhaps the best understanding of the Court's investment-backed
expectation claim comes from considering the analogous doctrine of
"vested rights" which is found in the land use area of the state
courts. 172 In general, a vested right occurs when a developer has expended considerable money and effort on a project. 173 Once the right
vests, the government may not change the rules applying to the project
because the impact upon the developer is so severe. The developer is
permitted to complete the project according to the rules which were in
effect when he began. A majority of the state courts reason that the
government is estopped from applying a new law when the owner, in
reliance upon the old law, has made a substantial change in position. 174
A major study of the case law identified the factors considered by the
state courts and consolidated them into the following rule.
A local government exercising its zoning powers will be estopped
when a property owner, ( 1) relying in good faith, (2) upon some act
or omission of the government, (3) has made a substantial change in
position or incurred such extensive obligations and expenses that it
would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the rights which he
ostensibly had acquired. 17 ~

The very statement of the investment-backed expectation test demonstrates the analogy with vested rights under an estoppel theory.
"Reasonable expectation" conforms to the first element that the developer relies in good faith. The government's failure to change the law
prior to the time the investment was made, is the government's omission to act. 176 "Investment-backed" reflects the requirement that there
be a substantial change in position. "Undue interference" indicates that
it would be inequitable and unjust to impose the new law upon the
owner. The vested rights doctrine has much to offer to the investmentbacked expectation analysis and may be utilized by the Court in the
requirements).
172. "[T]he rationale applied by a particular court . . might he hased on rigid concepts of
private property rights, theories of equitable estoppel, generalized prohibitions against retroactive
application of new laws, or vague concepts of fairness." C:unningbam & Kremer, Vested Rights,
Estoppel and the Land Development Process, 29 HASTJN(;S L.J. 625, 626 (1978).
173. See generally id.
174. !d. at 648.
175. Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of the Principles of t.'quitable Estoppel and
Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 URB. L. ANN. 63, 66.
176. This raises the issue of investments based upon the expectation that the law will change.
Such investments are not made in reliance upon the present state of the law and therefore would
not qualify under the estoppel tbeory.
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future if presented in a case where the Court reaches the merits of the
claim. 177
Because of its broad language and its focus on the fairness of the
impact to the property owner, the distinct investment-backed analysis
provides the Court with the flexibility to find a taking when the rest of
its analysis has failed to do so. This latitude affords the Court the ability to consider whether in "justice and fairness" the individual or the
public should bear the harsh impact of an otherwise valid regulation.

D.

Summary of the Impacts of Regulatory Takings

As can be seen, the impact caused by a regulation plays an important part in the Court's analysis. A confiscation by acquisition primarily considers the impact upon the owner's dominion over the property.
In particular it considers whether there has been a physical invasion, or
whether the regulation has the same effect upon the property owner's
use of the property as would a physical invasion.
An economic confiscation, on the other hand, hinges upon the present economic impact upon the owner. The issue is whether the value
of the property has been severely reduced, or whether a property owner
has been forced to provide a private economic subsidy to a social problem for which he is not responsible. A taking of an investment-backed
expectation depends upon a showing that a reasonable expectation, either economic or dominion oriented, has reached the level of being a
177. The Court has faced a "vested rights" argument at least once, Williamson County v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 192 n.12 (1985), but it did not reach the merits of the claim. The
plaintiff claimed that changes in the "cluster" zoning requirements which were imposed upon its
partially completed development had an unduly harsh impact because they interfered with its
"'expectation interest' in completing the development according to its original plans." ld. The
changes would allow only 67 units to be built while the plaintiff claimed it was originally entitled
to build over 476 units. At trial, an expert witness testified that this would result in a loss of over
one million dollars because of the expenditures on a golf course and other community developments which were included in the development based upon the original expectation that there
would be 409 more units than were now being allowed under the changes. Id. at 182.
Thus the evidence appears to indicate that it would not be profitable to develop 67
units because [plaintiff] had made various expenditures in the expectation that the development would contain far more units; the evidence does not appear to support the
proposition, that aside from those "reliance" expenditures, development of 67 units on
the property would not be economically feasible.
We express no view of the propriety of applying the 'economic viability' test when
the taking claim is based upon such a theory of 'vested rights' or 'expectation interest.'
It is sufficient for our purposes to note that whether the "property" taken is viewed as
the land itself or respondent's expectation interest in developing the land as it wished, it
is impossible to determine the extent of loss or interference until the Commission has
decided whether it will grant a variance from the application of the regulations.
!d. at 192 n.12 (citations omitted).
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"property interest" and that the impact of a regulation's interference
with that property interest would be unfair.
An attorney or court should conscientiously utilize the various
facts of a given case to shape a regulatory taking claim that identifies
how a regulation has in fact confiscated property by demonstrating its
impact(s) upon the property, rather than merely presenting the facts as
a hodgepodge of factors justifying a summary conclusion. There are,
however, other issues in a regulatory taking case which require careful
scrutiny.

III.

THE IssuEs OF REGULATORY CoNFISCATION

There are three primary issues which should be considered when
analyzing a regulatory taking claim. First, is the regulation the type of
regulation excepted from the requirements of the just compensation
clause/ 78 second, is the taking claim ripe/ 79 and third, is the regulation
invalid on due process grounds. 180

A.

Exceptions from the just Compensation Clause

Before ever considering the impacts of a regulation, one should
first consider whether or not the challenged regulation is the type of
regulation exempt from the limitations of the Just Compensation
Clause. There are "two exceptions where the destruction of property
does not constitute a taking." 181 The first exception arises when the
police power is used to prohibit a nuisance, thereby preventing a property owner from using his property to injure others. 182 The second exception is when the government prohibits a noninjurious use, but "the
178. See infra notes 181-232 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 233-86 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 287-345 and accompanying text.
181. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 144 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Each exception is based upon the objective of the regulation. The first exception, nuisance regulation, arises when the police power is exercised to protect the public from
injurious uses. The second exception, "average reciprocity of advantage," applies when the police
power is exercised to confer benefits upon the public. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 422 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
182. Long ago it was recognized that, 'all property in this country is held under the
implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community,'
and the Takings Clause did not transform that principle to one that requires compensation whenever the State asserts its power to enforce it.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1245 (1987) (quoting Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887)) (characterizing the regulation at issue as a restriction on an
"activity akin to public nuisance,'' but not relying upon the nuisance exception).
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prohibition applies over a broad cross section of land and thereby 'secure[s] an average reciprocity of advantage." 183

1.

Noxious uses: the nuisance exception

The regulation and abatement of a noxious use, i.e., a public nuisance, 184 is a proper exercise of the police power. 185 Nuisance regulations do not require compensation. 186 The justification for the exception
is that "all property in this country is held under the implied obligation
that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community." 187
This reasoning has remained essentially unchallenged by the Court
since Mugler v. Kansas. 188
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or
safety of the community, cannot in any just sense, be deemed a taking
or an appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such legislation
does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for
lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a
declaration by the State that its use by any one, for certain forbidden
purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests. 189
183. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 147 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415).
184. The Court has applied the exception to nuisance regulations regardless of whether they
are directed at a common law public nuisance, or at a statutory public nuisance. See Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962) ("Nor is it of controlling significance . . . that the
use prohibited is arguably not a common law nuisance."). See also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394, 411 (1915) ("granting that the business was not a nuisance per se, it was clearly within
the police power of the State to regulate it, 'and to that end to declare that in particular circumstances and in particular localities a livery stable shall be deemed a nuisance in fact and in law.'")
(citation omitted); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("A nuisance may be
merely a right thing in the wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard. If the
validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.") (citation omitted). Cf Comment, Zoning, supra note 4, at
1471-72 ("'Noxiousness' thus becomes simply a conclusory label reflecting some social consensus
about which property uses ought to be preferred.").
185. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 667.
186. "Courts have consistently held that a State need not provide compensation when it diminishes or destroys the value of property by stopping illegal activity or abating a public nuisance." Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1246 (citations omitted). See generally Van Alstyne, supra note
18, at 14-19.
187. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 665.
188. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). It should be noted, however, that the Court in Mugler denied the
just compensation claim in part because it was unwilling to recognize the Just Compensation
Clause as a possible limitation on the police power. See supra note 6.
189. /d. at 668-69 (note that "general welfare" is omitted from the standard purposes which
justify the use of the police power). The Court explained the public policy behind its holding:
The power which the States have of prohibiting such use . . . is not--and, consistently
with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be-burdened with the condition that the State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they
may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property,
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In simplified terms, nothing is taken from a property owner when
a public nuisance is abated since the property owner does not have any
right to injure others. 190
The traditionally 191 narrow 192 nuisance exception may be expanding. Recently, the Court considered the underlying reasoning of
the nuisance exception as a factor when addressing regulations which
restrict activities which are not nuisances, but which are nuisance-like

to inflict injury upon the community. The exercise of the police power by the destrucis very different from taking
tion of property which is itself a public nuisance, .
property for public use, or from depriving a person of his property without due process
of law. In the one case, a nuisance only is abated; in the other, unoffending property
is taken away from an innocent owner.
!d. at 669 (emphasis added).
190. The special status of this type of state action can also be understood on the simple
theory that since no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance
or otherwise harm others, the state has not "taken" anything when it asserts its power
to enjoin the nuisance-like activity.
Keystone, 107 S. Ct: at 1245 n.20 (citations omitted).
Another possible theory is that there is a distinction between property "rights," which enjoy
the backing of legal action against others, see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178
(1979), and property "freedoms," such as the freedom to use ones property to injure others. Only
the former is compensable if taken or destroyed. See generally Humbach, supra note 18.
191. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued in Keystone that the regulation at issue was "not the
type of regulation that our precedents have held to be within the 'nuisance exception' to takings
analysis." He identified two principles which have traditionally restricted the use of the nuisance
exception to a very narrow set of circumstances. "First, nuisance regulations exempted from the
Fifth Amendment have rested on discrete and narrow purposes." In particular, he argued, the
exception should not insulate regulations based "on essentially economic concerns" by labeling
them nuisance regulation. "Second, and more significantly, [the Court's] cases have never applied
the nuisance exception to allow complete extinction of the value of a parcel of property." Keystone,
107 S. Ct. at 1256-57 (citations omitted).
192. Arguably, the nuisance exception is so narrow that it requires a regulation to employ
the least restrictive means available before it may be excepted from the limitations of the Just
Compensation Clause.
[W]here there is a power to abate a nuisance, the abatement must be limited by its
necessity, and no wanton or unnecessary injury can be committed to the property or
rights of individuals. Thus, if the nuisance consists in the use to which a building is
put, the remedy is to stop such use, not to tear down or to demolish the building itself,
or to destroy property found within it.
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 678 (Field, J, dissenting).
Compare Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1243 ("The Subsidence Act . . is designed to accomplish a
number of widely varying interests, with reference to which petitioners have not suggested alternative methods . . .") (emphasis added); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414
(1922) ("Furthermore, [the regulation] is not justified as a protection of personal safety. That
could be provided for by notice."); Curtin, 222 U.S. at 86 (laws only regulating the use of property rather than completely prohibiting the use of property are permissible since "[s]uch laws
might be considered as strictly regulations of the use of property, of so using it that no injury could
result to others."). Cf Van Alstyne, supra note 18, at 11 ("a determination to proceed by police
regulation may be invalid, as a taking or damaging of private property, if less onerous but equally
effective methods for achieving the same public objectives are available, short of an exercise of the
eminent domain power.") (emphasis added).
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in nature. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. Debenedictis, 193
the Court, distinguishing Pennsylvania Coal, alluded to the possible
applicability of the nuisance exception/ 94 indicating that the subsidence
regulation resulted from a "public interest in preventing activities similar to public nuisances." 1911 The Court did not rely solely upon the
nuisance exception to uphold the regulation, but Keystone may trigger a
revival and expansion of the nuisance exception as a defense for governmental action. 196
In general, the nuisance exception inquiry will be "whether the
forbidden use is dangerous to the safety, health, or welfare of
others." 197 Those regulations which do not qualify for the nuisance exception may, nevertheless, be excepted from the limitations of the Just
Compensation Clause due to the "average reciprocity of advantage"
exception. 198

2.

The average reciprocity of advantage exception

Some laws which create public benefits rather than abate public
nuisances may seem confiscatory but have nevertheless been held constitutional because they secure for the regulated property owners an
"average reciprocity of advantage" from other regulatees. 199 The bur193. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
194. !d. at 1242-46. The Court, however, did not rely solely on its "activity akin to public
nuisance" id. at 1243, analysis, but rather treated it as a factor by continuing on and discussing
the economic impact of the regulation, id. at 1246.
195. /d. (emphasis added).
196. The expansion of the nuisance exception to include nuisance-like activities would allow
the exception to swallow the rule. If carried to its logical extreme, the Keystone interpretation
would eventually include most, if not all, real property regulations. Legislative bodies, in light of
the broad discretion afforded them in determining what is and is not a nuisance, would likely
characterize all of their regulations as nuisance abatement in order to take advantage of the exception (see cases cited supra note 184). Cf Comment, Zoning, supra note 4, at 1471 (criticizing the
noxious use test because "its terms are so manipulable that the protection offered can become
chimerical. The notion of what is noxious or harmful to the public can be expanded by courts or
legislatures almost as if at will.").
Nuisance regulation is not coterminous with the police power. See Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at
1256 (citing Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 145 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); and Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911) (nuisance exception
allows the government to prevent "a misuse or illegal use" and is not intended to allow "the
prevention of a legal and essential use, an attribute of its ownership."). Cf Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 33 ( 1954) (describing expansive breadth of police power). If the nuisance exception were
expanded until "nuisance" abatement and the police powers were coterminous, there would be no
Just Compensation Clause protection against confiscatory regulations. A regulation could never go
"'too far."
197. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 145 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
198. The availability of the "average reciprocity" exception also argues against the expansion
of the nuisance exception.
199. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415, see also id. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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dens imposed upon one property owner are offset by the benefits received from the same burdens being imposed by the regulation upon
other property owners. 200
The case originally referred to as the precedent for incorporating
the "average reciprocity of advantage" exception into regulatory taking
jurisprudence involved a Pennsylvania mining law which required a
wall of coal to be left along the borders of adjoining coal mines. This
barrier was intended to keep the mineworkers safe should an adjoining
mine be abandoned and allowed to fill with water. The regulation was
upheld because each property owner gave up a barrier of coal in exchange for increased safety in his own mine. 201
Reciprocity is a give-and-take notion. All parties are burdened so
that all parties may be benefitted. 202 The concept is readily apparent in
the area of zoning. A property owner in a residential zone is prevented
from using his property for industrial or commercial purposes. This
burden, however, is offset by the fact that his neighbor also cannot use
his land for those purposes. His land thereby has a greater value for
residential purposes than it otherwise would have had because there is
no possibility of a factory or shopping mall suddenly locating next
door. 203
Recently, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 204 the
The possible theory behind the reciprority exception, which has not received much attention
by the Court, is that the just compensation clause has been satisfied by non-monetary compensation. "[The property owner] is compensated for [his loss] by sharing in the general benefits which
the regulations are intended and calculated to secure." L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 599
(1900) (emphasis added). See also Van Alstyne, supra note 18, at 5. Cf Penn Central, 438 U.S.
at 137:
[T]he [transferable development] rights afforded are valuable. While these rights may
well not have constituted 'just compensation' if a 'taking' had occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken into account in considering the [economic]
impact of regulation.

200. "While zoning at times reduces individual property values, the burden is shared relatively evenly and it is reasonable to conclude that on a whole an individual wbo is harmed by one
aspect of the zoning will be benefited by another." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 147 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
201. Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914) adopted in Pennsylvania
Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
202. An analogous contractual example of a reciprocal agreement would be an agreement
between adjoining property owners to grant each other an easement across his own property in
exchange for an easement across the other's property.
203. "Euclidean zoning," the type of zoning at issue in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926), views the "highest" use of land as a neighborhood of single-family houses. Segmentation of residential from industrial and commercial uses is therefore necessary to promote this
highest use. See generally LUROVE, Tm: URRAN CoMMUNITY: HOUSING AND PLANNING IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA 1-22 (I 967).
204. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (property owners were required to convey a lateral easement across
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Court denied Justice Brennan's claim that there was a "reciprocity of
advantage" 206 for the Nollans. Justice Brennan argued that the conveyance of the easement demanded by the Coastal Commission provided
the Nollans with an advantage, an economic increase in value, which
they could not have otherwise enjoyed. 206 His argument was misguided
because it centered upon a supposed exchange 207 between the property
owner and the government, when reciprocity requires a mutual exchange "between the owner of the property restricted and the rest of
the [regulated] community." 208 The reciprocity exception was therefore
denied. 209
Regulations which provide a true reciprocity of advantage are not
restricted by the Just Compensation Clause because they do not
"fore[ e] some people alone to bear public burdens." 210 Those individuals which receive the "public" benefit of the regulation bear a reciprocal "public" burden. While the Court has not expressly invoked the
reciprocity exception in its recent cases, it has considered the concept of
reciprocity as a factor. The Court's analysis, however, has been mconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the term "reciprocity." 211
their beachfront in order to obtain a building permit to construct a new residence).
205. /d. at 3158 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
206. Justice Brennan claimed the Nollans received an advantage because the net value of
their property increased, despite the conveyance of the easement. /d.
207. As the majority held, Justice Brennan's argument fails in part because there was no
exchange; the government did not confer any benefit upon the Nollans by granting the permit.
"[T]he right to build on one's own property~even though its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements~cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental benefit.'" /d. at
3146 n.2.
208. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan's interpretation of the exception was particularly improper because it would
allow the government to commit "an out and out plan of extortion," by imposing stringent permitting requirements and then denying permits until the property owner surrendered whatever property rights the government demanded, so long as the granting of the permit increased the value of
the property. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3148 (citations omitted).
209. An inverse form of reciprocity was also discussed in Nollan because it was an "exaction" case. In an exaction situation the government may impose a burden upon a developer equal
to the burden he places upon society by developing. The government may require a large developer to dedicate a percentage of his property to be used for a new school or park, in order to
mitigate the burden of increased infrastructure and support services. The general rule is that "an
exaction is valid only if it does not exceed what is reasonably appropriate to satisfy the public need
caused by the project." Van Alstyne, supra note 18, at 62. If the value of an exaction from a
developer exceeds the increased burden caused by the development, the developer bears more of
the public burden than the rest of the public. See Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3147 n.4:
If the Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden of California's attempt to
remedy these problems, although they had not contributed to it more than other coastal
owners landowners, the state's action, even if otherwise valid might violate either the
incorporated Takings Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.
210. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (emphasis added).
211. "Reciprocity: . . That which is reciprocal, especially obligation of right; equal mutual
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In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,Z 12 the
challenged regulation prohibited owners of "landmarks" from taking
any action which would damage the historic nature of the landmark. 213
Without invoking the reciprocity exception, the Court utilized the doctrine as a factor in determining whether the regulation unfairly imposed a public burden upon the owners of the landmarks. It upheld the
regulation even though it had "a more severe impact on some landowners than on others." 214 The Court argued that the more severe impact
did not defeat the reciprocity exception since "[l]egislation designed to
promote the general welfare commonly burdens some more than
others. " 215
An examination of the Court's analysis reveals that it is inconsistent with the concept of reciprocity and should not be confused with the
actual exception. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, criticized the Penn Central Court for ignoring the regulation's unfair degree of impact upon
the individual owners of the "landmarks. " 216 The regulation "singled
rights and benefits granted and enjoyed; mutual equality of rights and benefits." FUNK AND WAG·
NALL'S NF.W STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGI.ISH LANGUAGE 2063 (19th ed. 1963).
212. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
213. The regulation applied to various structures scattered throughout the city rather than to
a historic preservation zone wherein all structures would be preserved. A historic zone would
likely qualify for the reciprocity exception since each member in the zone would be similarly
burdened and each would receive the benefit of the zone's preservation. See id. at 135 n.32, see
also id. at 147 n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
214. ld. at 133. The Court justified the "unique burden" by citing Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibition of a brick plant within the city limits was not a taking); Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (destruction of cedar trees which posed a threat to the local
commercial apple orchards was not a taking); and Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)
(safety regulation which prohibited excavation below the water table was not a taking). Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133-34 n.30 (1978). The regulations
in each case, however, were nuisance regulations and therefore should be considered to have been
exempt from the just compensation clause regardless of the severity of the burden placed upon the
property owner. See supra notes 184-98 and accompanying text.
215. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133. The Court's argument is defective because it centers on
the "subjective" rather than "objective" impact of regulations. The Court stated, "For example,
the property owner in Euclid who wished to use its property for industrial purposes was affected
far more severely by the ordinance than its neighbors who wished to use their land for residences."
ld. at 134. The Court's statement ignores the reality that the regulation imposed the same objective burden upon each property owner within the residential zone. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379-83 (1926). The statement also begs the question since the very nature of a
just compensation taking is that certain individuals are burdened in a manner different from the
rest of the public.
216. If the cost of preserving Grand Central Terminal were spread evenly across the
entire population of the city of New York, the burden per person would be in cents per
year . . . . Instead, however, appellees would impose the entire cost of several million
dollars per year on Penn Central. But it is precisely this sort of discrimination that the
Fifth Amendment prohibits.

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 148-49.
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out" 217 the individual "landmark" owners and forced them to bear the
total public burden of landmark preservation in New York City. 218
The Court justified the regulation because the landmark owners received the benefit of the regulation, 219 but it was clear that the intended
beneficiary of the regulation was the public at large, not the individual
landmark owners. 220
Assuming arguendo that the regulation provided some benefit, albeit minimal and indirect, to the landmark owners as members of the
general community, such a fact is irrelevant to the doctrine of reciprocity. Reciprocity requires "mutual equality of rights and benefits." 221
The fact that "the preservation of landmarks benefits all New York
citizens and all structures, both economically and by improving the
quality of life in the city as a whole," 222 may justify the regulation as
being an otherwise proper use of the police power, but it does not qualify a regulation for the reciprocity exception. 223
Not only were the benefits and rights unequal, they were not mutual. Reciprocity is reciprocal. 22 " The minimal benefits received by the
landmark owners did not come from those who received the benefit of
their burden, the public at large. The Court claimed that the regulation
did not "solely burden" the plaintiff because it applied "to vast numbers of structures in the city." 2211 The size of the group, however, is
immaterial to determining whether reciprocity exists. 226 The term reci217. /d. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
218. [The regulation] is uniquely felt and is not offset by any benefits Oowing from the
preservation of some 400 other 'landmarks' in New York City. [The Landmarks Law has] imposed a substantial cost on less than one-tenth of one percent of the buildings in New York City
for the general benefit of all its people. It is exactly this imposition of general costs on a few
individuals at which the 'taking' protection is directed.
/d. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
219. /d. at 134.
220. The city believed that comprehensive measures to safeguard desirable features of
the existing urban fabric would benefit its citizens in a variety of ways: e.g., fostering
"civic pride in the beauty and noble accomplishments of the past"; protecting and enhancing "the city's attraction to tourists and visitors"; "support[ing] and stimul[ating]
business and industry"; "strengthening the economy of the city"; and "promoting the
use of historic districts, landmarks, interior landmarks and scenic landmarks for the
education, pleasure and welfare of the people of the city.
/d. at 109 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
221. See supra note 211.
222. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134.
223. If mutual equality of rights and benefits is not required for the exception, it would
destroy the possibility of there ever being a regulatory taking. Every plaintiff, as a member of
society, would always receive some benefit from any regulation imposed upon him for the benefit
of society, and would thereby be foreclosed from bringing suit against the regulation.
224. See supra note 211.
225. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134, 135 n.32.
226. The Court's statement ignores the fact that a regulation may effectively take property

138

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 2

procity implies that the members of a regulated group receive a reciprocal benefit from those who benefit from their burden, i.e., in order to be
reciprocal, the regulation must primarily burden and benefit the members of the regulated group, not the public at large. Since reciprocity
applies only to members of the group, the size of the group is irrelevant. In Penn Central, the landmark owners were singled out, albeit
they were a large group, to bear alone the admittedly public burden of
"promoting the use of historic landmarks," 227 without receiving any reciprocal advantage from the public at large.
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 228 the
Court recently referred to "the notion of 'reciprocity of advantage,' "
without actually invoking the exception. Rather than speaking of the
reciprocal advantage of the challenged regulation, the Court spoke of
how each individual receives an advantage from being regulated because he then lives in a regulated society. 229 "While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from
the restrictions that are placed on others. These restrictions are properly treated as part of the burden of common citizenship." The Court's
observation, however, relates to the justification of the state's police
power in general, 230 not to whether the challenged regulation requires
compensation for unfairly burdening some individuals. Reciprocity, by
definition, only exists within the regulation itself. 231 Burdens placed on
a property owner by one regulation are not offset by benefits received
from a totally unrelated regulation. 232

from a large group of property owners as well as from an individual. See generally Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (regulation requiring all landlords
to permit the installation of cable TV facilities was held a taking).
227. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 109. See also id. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Where
a relatively few individual buildings, all separated from one another, are singled out and treated
differently from surrounding buildings, no such reciprocity exists.").
228. I 07 S. Ct. 1232, 1245 ( 1987).
229. /d. (citations omitted).
230. "It is true that appellees must bear the costs of these regulations. But within limits, that
is a burden borne to secure 'the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community.' "
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979).
231. "[When] all property owners in a designated area are placed under the same restric·
tions, not only for the benefit of the municipality as a whole but for the common benefit of one
another .
there is "an average reciprocity of advantage." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 140
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted; emphasis added).
232. The logical extension of the Court's Keystone "social reciprocity" formulation would
mean the denial of all regulatory taking claims. No member of society would have standing to
challenge an individual regulation because he would be a beneficial recipient of other regulations.
Cf Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (recip·
rocal advantage doctrine is inappropriate when there is a nuisance regulation because there is no
reciprocal advantage to regulatees of nuisance regulations "unless it be the advantage of living and
doing business in a civilized community.").
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In summary, the average reciprocity of advantage exception by
definition requires that those who are burdened by a regulation receive
a reciprocal benefit from those who receive the benefit of their burden.
If reciprocity is found to exist in a regulation, then the property owner
cannot claim to be unfairly burdened, because he is receiving an offsetting benefit.

B.

The Ripeness Requirements

Before the Supreme Court applies any of the foregoing regulatory
takings tests, it requires that the claimant overcome a high threshold of
ripeness which it has imposed in order to avoid the constitutional issues
being raised. 233 The Court has refused to review governmental regulations before they inflict actual, rather than potential, constitutional injury upon the landowner. 234 Unless a facial challenge is being made, 2311
a regulation which is merely "on the books" does not inflict an actual
injury, i.e., it cannot have an unduly harsh impact, until there is a final
administrative decision 236 that the regulation will be applied to particular property, 237 and a final decision as to how it will be applied. 238

233. "Indeed, few concepts have had more faithful adherence in this Court than the imperative of avoiding constitutional resolution of issues capable of being disposed of otherwise." Moore
v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 526 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
234. Cf id. at 525 (Burger, C.J., dissenting):
[I]f administrative remedies are pursued, the citizen may win complete relief without
needlessly invoking judicial process. This permits the parties to resolve their disputes by
relatively informal means far less costly and time consuming that litigation. By requiring exhaustion of administrative processes the courts are assured of reviewing only final
decisions arrived at after considered judgment. It also permits agencies an opportunity
to correct their own mistakes or give discretionary relief short of judicial review.
235. See infra notes 268-86 and accompanying text.
236. A final administrative decision should not be confused with a final judgment by a state
court. The United States Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is limited to "[f]inal judgments or
decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in which a decision could be had." 28 USC §
1257. See e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 630-31 n.10 (1981)
(appeal dismissed because state court's judgment was not final). The "final decision" is a final
determination by the administrative body charged with the enforcement of the challenged regulation as to how the regulation will be applied.
237. E.g. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)
[I]f ever the provisions set forth in the ordinance in tedious and minute detail, come to
be concretely applied to particular premises, . . . or to particular conditions, or to be
considered in connection with specific complaints, some of them, or even many of them,
may be found to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.
238. If [the property owners] were to seek administrative relief . . . a mutually acceptable solution might well be reached with regard to individual properties, thereby obviating the need to address the constitutional questions. The potential for such administrative solutions confirms the conclusion that the taking issue decided by the district
court simply is not ripe for judicial resolution.
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 297 (1981).
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Three ripeness prerequisites have been identified by the Supreme
Court: 1) the plaintiff has sought and been denied just compensation, 239
2) the plaintiff has applied and been denied the variances which could
save the constitutionality of the regulation, 240 and 3) the Court is able
to determine the permissible use of the property under the challenged
regulation. 241

1.

The denial of just compensation

The clearest ripeness requirement imposed by the Court upon a
just compensation "taking" claim is the necessity of a denial of just
compensation. 242 "The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking
of property; it proscribes the taking without just compensation." 2 " 3 Until compensation is denied, there is no final constitutional injury. 2 ""
The typical form of seeking relief for "uncompensated takings" is
inverse condemnation. 245 "(I]f a state provides an adequate procedure
for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure
and been denied compensation." 246 A property owner may satisfy the
requirement, however, if he can prove that the state does not have adequate procedures for such a claim. 247 Once a property owner has been
denied "just compensation" for an alleged taking, his prior claim for
compensation matures into a constitutional claim and may be ripe for
adjudication so long as the other ripeness requirements are met.
239. See infra notes 242-47 and accompanying text.
240. See infra notes 248-65 and accompanying text.
241. See infra notes 257-67 and accompanying text.
242. The denial of just compensation occurs whenever a claim for compensation is denied,
even if denial is based upon legal principles. See e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987) (the courts' dismissal upon demurrer was the
equivalent of a denial of compensation, thereby making the claim ripe for review).
243. Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, 473 US. 172, 194 (1985).
244. " 'The federal question embraces not only a taking, but a laking on payment of just
compensation. A stale judgment is not final until it covers both aspects of that integral problem.' "
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 633 (1981) (quoting North Dakota
Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 US. 156, 163 (1973)).
245. Property owners may seek just compensation through inverse condemnation procedures
when the government has not formally exercised its power of eminent domain to condemn their
property. "We have recognized that a landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse condemnation as a result of the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect to
compensation .
_ [C]laims for just compensation are grounded in the Constitution itself." First
English, 107 S. Ct. at 2386 (citations omitted).
246. Williamson County, 473 US. at 195.
247. /d. at 196-97 ("Respondent has not shown that the inverse condemnation procedure is
unavailable or inadequate, and until it has utilized that procedure, its taking claim is
premature.,').
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The denial of variances

Whenever a variance from a regulation is available, the mere enactment of the regulation, or the denial of a land-use proposal,248 is not
a final administrative decision that the regulation will be applied to a
particular piece of property. The presumption is that the granting of a
variance may prevent an unconstitutional taking. 249 While total exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required, 250 if the property
owner fails to seek a variance, the Court will refuse to reach the merits
of a taking claim unless the plaintiff properly alleges 2111 the futility of
such application. 2112
248. The denial of an original proposal or permit application is not an automatic denial of
the needed variances. It is only an indication that further proceedings are needed which may or
may not grant the desired relief from the regulations. Cf id. at 188-90 ("Thus, in the face of
respondent's refusal to follow the procedures for requesting a variance, . . respondent hardly can
maintain that the Commission's disapproval of the preliminary plat was equivalent to a final
derision that no variances would be granted.").
249. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 297
( 1981 ). See supra note 238.
250. The property owner in Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172, claimed that since its claim
was a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action, which does not require administrative exhaustion, it did
not need to apply for variances. The Court rejected the contention:
The question whether administrative remedies must be exhausted is conceptually distinct, however, from the question whether an administrative action must be final before
it is judicially reviewable. While the policies undedying the two concepts overlap, the
finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decision-maker has arrived at
a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion
requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision
is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate.
Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 192-93 (1985) (citations omitted).
251. The effect of a demurrer upon allegations of futility in a complaint is unsettled. In
MacDonald, Sommer and Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986), the property owner
claimed that the denial of its subdivision plans restricted its land to economically unacceptable
agricultural uses. The plaintiff alleged in capital letters that "ANY APPLICATION FOR A
ZONE CHANGE, VARIANCE OR OTHER RELIEF WOULD BE FUTILE." !d. at 2564.
The county demurred. Under California law, however, a demurrer "does not admit contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged therein." Id. at 2564 n.3 (quoting from Daar v.
Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 713, 433 P.2d 732, 745 (1967)).
The California courts refused to accept the demurrer to the allegations of futility because they
were "conclusionary"; and the United States Supreme Court, in deference to the state law, did not
disturb the holding of the California courts. McDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2564. Justice White, (joined
in his dissent by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist,) argued that the allegations of futility were properly plead and did indicate that a "takings" had occurred. !d. at 256970. The Court, however, has yet to rule on the sufficiency of general allegations of futility under
state law other than California.
252. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 188 (accepting the feasibility of plaintiffs claim but
finding that no evidence existed to support it; no indication given as to what would constitute an
adequate record). Compare Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452
U.S. 264, 297 (1981) (claims that the regulation made mining economically impossible were not
reached since the mining companies did not apply for variances or waivers); with Hodel v. Indi-
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Variances are particularly critical to determining economic viability of propertl 63 because the focus of the Court's analysis is on the
permitted uses, not the denied uses. 264 Taking claims turn on variances
because they determine the actual uses which will be allowed despite
any regulatory language to the contrary. 266 Since variances may lessen
the harshness of a regulation's potential impact by making a project
economically viable, they must be denied before a taking may occur. 266

3.

The permissible use requirement

Another purported ripeness issue which has increased the uncertainty of the Court's taking jurisprudence 267 is the requirement that the
ana, 452 U.S. at 331-33 (even though there was no provision made in the regulation for variances;
the regulation was upheld against a facial challenge).
One of the few explanations of when variances may not be required was indicated by Chief
Justice Burger in his dissent in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). After arguing for
judicial restraint in zoning cases, he stated that he would not require exhaustion of administrative
remedies unless it was "a case where inadequate or unclear or costly remedies make exhaustion
inappropriate, or where the Board's position relating to appellant's claim is so fixed that further
administrative review would be fruitless." /d. at 529 (emphasis added).
253. The variance requirement is less important when addressing an "appropriation" if the
enactment of the regulation itself is likely to have caused a universal occupation or imposition of
an easement upon all regulatees. See generally supra notes 30-70 and accompanying text. It does,
however, play the same vital role when determining if all beneficial use has been taken.
254. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
255. "Absent a final decision regarding the application of all eight of the Commissions objections, it is impossible to tell whether the land retained any reasonable beneficial use or whether
respondent's expectation interests had been destroyed." Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 190 n.11.
"Accordingly, until the commission determines that no variances will be granted, it is impossible
for the jury to find
whether respondent 'will be able to derive economic benefit' from the
land." Id. at 191.
256. Arguably, this general rule applies only to claims regarding individual property. Variances are irrelevant to facial challenges, either because the constitutional harm has already occurred or because the harm is universal in nature, injuring all property holders. See Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926).
Variances may also be irrelevant when addressing substantive due process issues since they
exacerbate rather than cure the infirmities of the regulation. Cf Moore, 431 U.S. 494 (failure to
apply for variance was not fatal to plaintiffs claim when regulation denied substantive due
process).
Any suggestion that the variance procedure . . assumes a special significance is without merit.
. the matter of a variance is irrelevant . . because the municipality is
constitutionally powerless to abridge [the rights of the property owner]. Thus, the existence of the variance procedure serves to lessen neither the irrationality of the [regula. Furthermore, the very existence of the 'escape
tion J nor the extent of its intrusion.
hatch' of the variance procedure only heightens the irrationality . . since application
of the ordinance then depends upon [the discretion of the authorities.]
ld. at 511-13 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). But compare id. at 522 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (the variance procedure is intended to accommodate any "practical difficulties and unnecessary hardships").
257. See generally Comment, Land Use Takings and the Problem of Ripeness in the United
States Supreme Court Cases, 1 B.Y.U. ]. Pus. L. 375 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Ripeness].
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Court be able to ascertain how a regulation will in fact be applied 258
once an initial development proposal has been denied. 259
It follows from the nature of regulatory takings claim that an essential prerequisite to its assertion is a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of development legally permitted on the
subject property. A court cannot determine whether a regulation has
gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes. 260

There is no presumption that a less intensive plan would meet
with disapproval. "Rejection of exceedingly grandiose development
plans does not logically imply that less ambitious plans will receive
similarly unfavorable reviews." 261 A land owner must therefore show
the type of use and the intensity of development which would be permitted on the land under the challenged regulations, 262 as well as the
possible alternative uses which are unaffected because they 'ire outside
the scope of the challenged regulations. 263
The question, in essence, as stated by the Court in MacDonald,
258. The Court's requirement is impractical. A denial of a development plan gives no indication as to the type or intensity of development which would be approved. In order to know how
discretionary laws will be applied, a property owner must make repeated applications until a plan
is finally accepted. "Nothing in our cases, however, suggests that the decisionmaker's definitive
position may be determined only from explicit denials of property-owner applications for development. Nor do these cases suggest that repeated applications and denials are necessary to pinpoint
that decision." MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2571 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting). If the developer does make repeated applications until one is approved, he
may find that he has "cross[ed] the threshold of ripeness only to find himself in the realm of
mootness" because he may now make some use of his property. See Comment, Ripeness, supra
note 257, at 394.
259. Such proposals typically include requests for zoning changes and other discretionary
decisions. The property owner's claim is that the discretionary denial of the changes effects a
taking. See e.g., MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. 2561.
260. !d. at 2566.
261. !d. at 2569 n.9. See also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 136-37 (1978) (emphasis added):
While the Commission's actions in denying applications to construct an office building
in excess of 50 stories above the Terminal may indicate that it will refuse to issue a
certificate of appropriateness for any comparably sized structure, nothing the Commission has said or done suggests an intention to prohibit any construction above the
Terminal.
262. The Court failed to make a distinction between land-use regulations which permit development "as of right" and "conditional" or "discretionary" development. Zoning requirements
usually place limits on property which create a developmental "envelope" which applies uniformly
to all property in the zone. As long as the property owner's plans are within that envelope, he may
follow his plan "as of right;" the government is bound by its regulations. If, however, a property
owner wishes to exceed the envelope, the government has discretion to grant or deny permission
for such development. Arguably, the Court is requiring that the plaintiff delineate the zoning
envelope so that it may determine whether any economically viable use remains "as of right."
263. See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 ( 1981) (the availability of alternative permissible
uses defeated a facial challenge that the regulation destroyed the economic viability of mining).
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Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 264 is not how much development will
be denied but how much development will be permitted. 2611 In applying
this rule to the facts 266 in MacDonald, the Court held that "in this
case, the holdings of both courts below leave open the possibility that
some development will be permitted, and thus again leave us in doubt
regarding the antecedent question whether appellant's property has
been taken. " 267
4.

Facial challenges

Another taking issue which may be confused with the ripeness requirement is the Court's treatment of facial challenges. 268 A property
264. I 06 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) (landowner filed suit after denial of an intensive residential
subdivision plan).
265. Cf Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104. The mere denial of a development plan in Penn
Central was not a taking when there was the possibility of less intensive development. Penn Central applied for, and was denied, a permit to develop a 55 story office building above its historic
Grand Central Terminal. The Court held that the property owner "exaggerated" the effect of the
denial of its permit on its ability to make use of its air rights above the terminal. "Since appellants
have not sought approval for the construction of a smaller structure, we do not know that appellants will be denied any use of any portion of the airspace above the terminal." /d. at 137. The
Court, however, did not find that the lack of a less intensive application invalidated the claim for a
lack of ripeness, but rather, it went on to discuss the merits of the claim.
266. The property owners submitted a subdivision proposal which was rejected by the Yolo
County Planning Commission. The area was zoned residential by the county, but was designated
as an "Agricultural Preserve or Reserve" by the city of Davis. The property owner alleged that
regardless of any modification to its plan, the County would not allow any development other than
agricultural, thereby appropriating the entire economic use of the property "for the sole purpose of
[providing] . . a public, open space buffer." MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2563-64 (citations
omitted).
The Board of Supervisors of the County affirmed the Planning Commission's denial. The
Board found several plausible reasons for rejecting the proposed plan. First, there was inadequate
street access. Second, the plan did not provide for sewer service by any governmental agency.
Third, the Board felt that the level of police protection available for the proposed subdivision
would be inadequate. Finally, the proposed water system was inadequate to handle the needs of
the proposed subdivision. Id.
267. !d. at 2568-69. The Court's "insistence on knowing the nature and extent of permitted
development before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that purport to limit it" id.
at 2567, stems primarily from its impact analysis. Compare id. at 2568 ("the holdings of both
courts below leave open the possibility that some development will be permitted") with Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 (1980) ("[A]ppellants may be permitted to build as many as five
houses on their five acres."). The more consistent approach to the ripeness language of MacDonald would be to treat it as a de facto holding that the plaintiff simply failed to produce sufficient
evidence to prove that he has been denied all beneficial or economically viable use of the property.
268. Most claims which are characterized by the Court as economic taking claims have also
been characterized as "facial challenges" and thereby been unsuccessful. E.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987) (claim that subsidence regulation requiring coal to be left in the ground made it commercially impracticable to mine coal failed as a facial
challenge); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (claim that zoning regulation destroyed all
economic use failed as a facial challenge). Most cases, however, where the Court has reached the
merits have been characterized as acquisition claims. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
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owner may claim that a regulation is unconstitutional on its face because "the mere enactment" of it effects a "taking. " 269 Facial challenges
have typically been unsuccessful, 270 not because they are improper, 271
but because the unique 272 burden of proof2 73 placed upon plaintiffs IS
so heavy 274 that plaintiffs are seldom able to satisfy it. 275
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (permanent physical occupation imposed by regulation was a
taking); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (imposition of limited easement was not a taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (imposition of easement was a taking). Cf Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) (imposition
of easement was a deprivation of property without due process). Even if the Court is willing to
characterize a claim as an appropriation, it will still avoid the claim if it can by characterizing it
as a facial challenge. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 56 U.S.L.W. 4168 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1988)
(claim that rent control was a transfer of landlord's property to individual hardship tenants was
not considered ripe because it was a facial challenge).
269. See e.g., Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1246 ("[Tjhe only question before the court is whether
the mere enactment of the statutes and regulations constitutes a taking.") (quoting the District
Court, 581 F. Supp. 511, 513 (1984)) (emphasis found in Keystone).
270. One of the few cases wherein a regulation was found to be unconstitutional on its face
was Pennsylvania Coal. It should be noted however, that "the statute [was) admitted to destroy
previously existing rights of property." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922)
An unsuccessful facial challenge does not bar future claims that the regulation "as applied"
effects a taking. See e.g. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S.
264, 297 n.40 (1981):
Although we conclude that "mere enactment" of the Act did not effect a taking of
private property, this holding does not preclude appellees or other coal mine operators
from attempting to show that as applied to particular parcels of land, the act and the
Secretary's regulations effect a taking.
271. Traditionally, facial challenges have not been affected by the doctrine of ripeness since
the regulation has been enacted and is therefore final.
It is entirely clear from [the) cases that a facial takings challenge is not premature even
if it rests upon the ground that the ordinance deprives property owners of all economically viable use of their Iand-a ground that is, as we have said, easier to establish in
an 'as-applied' attack.
Pennell, 56 U.S.L. W. at 4172 (Scalia, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part). See also Euclid,
359 U.S. at 386 (a motion made in the lower court to dismiss plaintifrs claim because plaintiff
had made no effort to obtain a building permit, i.e., because it was a facial challenge to the
regulation, was properly overruled). But compare Pennell, 56 U.S.L. W. at 4170.
272. The posture of the case is critical because we have recognized an important distinction between a claim that the mere enactment of a statute constitutes a taking and a
claim that the particular impact of government action on a specific piece of property
requires the payment of just compensation.
Keystone, 107 S Ct. at 1247.
273. "Petitioners . . face an uphill battle in making a facial attack on [any) Act as a taking." ld. See also Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. at 296 (if a regulation merely regulates, and does
not prohibit, a particular use of property, there would be "no reason to suppose that 'mere enactment' of [an] act has deprived [property owners) of economically viable use of their property.");
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (any possibility of making economic use of the land under
regulation prevents a finding that a regulation, on its face, is a taking).
274. Extremely hesitant to encourage facial challenges, the Court has given various reasons
why facial challenges carry a high burden. Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. at 296-97 (economic
viability cannot be determined on the face of the regulation); Agins, 447 U.S. at 262 (there is no
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The Court will "not disregard the posture in which the case comes
before [it]." 276 The high burden imposed is a result of the Court's "oftrepeated admonition that the constitutionality of statutes ought not be
decided except in an actual factual setting that makes such a decision
necessary." 277 In general, 278 the Court has held that without land to
which the regulation is applied, there is no "concrete controversy" 279 to
be decided.
The most recent takings case decided by the Court raises some
question as to the continued validity of facial challenges. In Pennell v.
City of San Jose, 280 the Court encountered a facial challenge that a rent
control regulation effected a transfer of the landlord's property to individual "hardship tenants." 281 After taking great pains to explain that
interference with a property owner's investment backed expectations until application is made and
denied). Cf Pennell, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4170 (there was no evidence that the regulation had ever
been used).
275. The following cases were characterized as facial challenges and were unsuccessful. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 56 U.S.L.W. 4168 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1988); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981 ); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Agins v. Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). The one successful facial challenge was
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), but the facial challenge portion of Pennsylvania Coal has arguably been overruled by Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1241 (referring to the facial
portion of the Pennsylvania Coal opinion as an "uncharacteristically . . advisory opinion").
27 6. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1246.
277. Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. at 294-95 ("Adherence to this rule is particularly important in cases raising allegations of an unconstitutional taking of private property.")
278. The possible exception would be if a regulation inflicted irreparable harm. Cf Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 528 n.3 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (there may be no need to
seek administrative remedies if doing so would cause irreparable injury) (citing First Amendment
cases wherein the application for a permit was not required prior to bringing a claim because such
application would render the claim moot if granted). See e.g., Agins, 447 U.S. at 261 ("their
enactment inflicted no irreparable injury upon the landowner.") (citing Euclid, 272 U.S. at 39597).
279. Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. at 295.
We conclude that the District Court's ruling on the "taking" issue suffers from a fatal
deficiency: neither appellees nor the Court identified any property in which appellees
have an interest that has allegedly been taken by operation of the Act.
These "ad hoc, factual inquiries" must be conducted with respect to specific property, and the particular estimates of economic impact and ultimate valuation relevant in
the unique circumstances.
!d. at 294-95.
280. 56 U.S.L.W. 4168 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1988).
281. The San Jose rent control ordinance requires a hearing if a tenant objected to a rent
increase in excess of eight percent. A provision of the regulation requires a "Mediation Hearing
Officer" to consider "the hardship to the tenant" in determining whether the increase is reasonable. See supra note 132, quoting the ordinance. The plaintiffs claimed that the possible denial of a
rent increase based upon the individual financial circumstances of a tenant amounted to a housing
subsidy provided by the individual landlord. The landlords contended that since landlords could be
forced individually to bear the public burden of subsidized housing, the regulation was unconstitu-
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the plaintiffs had standing,282 the Court, citing ripeness as a reason,
refused to reach the merits of their facial taking claim.
The Court thought it would be "premature to consider [the plaintiff's] contention on the present record." 283 It reasoned that "there simply [was] no evidence that the 'tenant hardship clause' has in fact ever
been relied upon by a Hearing Officer to reduce a rent . . . . " 284 Because of the " 'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiry' involved in the takings analysis," the Court held that the case "[did] not present a sufficiently factual setting for the adjudication of the takings claim
appellants raise[ d] here. " 286
In his dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the Court for not reaching
the merits of the facial challenge. He argued that any additional factual
evidence would not contribute to the Court's ability to decide the case.
Knowing the nature and character of the particular property in question, or the degree of its economic impairment, will in no way assist
this inquiry. Such factors are irrelevant to the present claim as we
have said they are to the claim that a Jaw effects a taking by authorizing a permanent physical invasion of property. 286

It is uncertain how Pennell will affect the relationship between
facial challenges and the ripeness issue. Either facial challenges will no
longer be considered ripe, thereby effectively rendering them invalid
tiona! on its face. /d. at 4170.
282. When standing is challenged on the basis of the pleadings, we accept as true all
material allegations of the complaint . . . . Here, appellants specifically alleged in their
complaint that appellant's properties are "subject to the terms or' the Ordinance, and
they stated at oral argument that the Association represents "most of the residential
unit owners in the city and [has] many hardship tenants." Accepting the truth of these
statements, which appellees do not contest, it is not "unadorned speculation" to conclude that the Ordinance will be enforced against members of the Association. The
likelihood of enforcement, with the concomitant probability that a landlord's rent will
be reduced below what he or she would otherwise be able to obtain in the absence of
the Ordinance, is a sufficient threat of actual injury to satisfy Art. III's requirement
that "[a] plaintiff who challenges a statute must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement."
!d. at 4169.
283. /d. at 4170.
284. /d. But cf Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 87 (1911) ("It is no answer to say that the
power would not be arbitrarily or unreasonably exercised. It must be judged by what can be done
under it, not by what may [in the future] be done under it."). The Court placed great emphasis on
the fact that the Hearing Officer's power to reduce a rent increase based upon the potential hardship to the tenant was discretionary. The Hearing Officer "shall consider the economic hardship
imposed," but, "he may order that the excess increase be disallowed." Pennell, 56 U.S.L.W. at
4170 (citations omitted).
285. /d. at 4170.
286. !d. at 4172 (Scalia, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part) (citing Loretto, 458 U.S.
419) See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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since traditional ripeness requires an "as applied" factual situation, or
Pennell will be interpreted as impliedly holding, because of its affirmation of the California Supreme Court's holding, that the government
did not effect a taking by the "mere enactment" of the regulation. In
either case, facial challenges should be avoided if possible because of
their heavy burden and uncertain nature.

C.

Substantive Due Process

Substantive due process analysis 287 has not been widely used by
the Court, 288 but i• has often been intertwined with "regulatory takings" claims 289 thereby influencing, and sometimes confusing, the
Court's treatment of those claims. 290 The question of due process and
287. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in
the common interest.
. [T]he guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the
means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the objective sought to be
obtained.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523, 525 (1934) quoted favorably in Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84-85 (1980).
288. Compare Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) ("Substantive due process has
at times been a treacherous field for this Court. . . . [Its] history counsels caution and restraint.
But it does not counsel abandonment."); with Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 333 (1981) ("[B]y
invalidating the challenged provisions of the Act under the rubric of 'substantive due process,' the
District Court essentially acted as a superlegislature, passing on the wisdom of congressional policy determination. In so doing, the court exceeded its proper role.") (citations omitted).
289. E.g. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 395 (1922) (Brief for appellant)
("the Kohler Act takes the property of the Coal Company without due process of law," and "there
is no justification for the uncompensated transfer of the beneficial use of the supporting coal from
defendant to plaintiff."); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 591 (1962) (plaintiff alleged that
regulation which prohibited excavation below the water table prevented plaintiff from continuing
its business, and was therefore a "taking" of property without due process).
Another contributing factor to the confusion is the interchangeability of the claims. E.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64 n.21 (1979) (the plaintiffs' appeared to cast their argument in
terms of economic substantive due process at the District Court level, but used the terminology of
the Takings Clause before the Supreme Court).
290. The early Court did little to distinguish between the two Fifth Amendment claims. In
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Court "fused" one standard for both
claims. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 514 (Stevens,]., concurring).
In some modern cases the Court has been more conscientious about the distinction between a
Fifth Amendment due process claim and a Fifth Amendment just compensation claim. Cf Pennell, 56 U.S.L.W. 4168 (separate treatment of the three facial challenges found in the claim: just
compensation clause, due process, and equal protection); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 425-26 (even if the
regulation served a legitimate public purpose, "[i]t is a separate question, however, whether an
otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights that compensation must be paid.");
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) ("There is little merit to appellant's argument that they have been denied their property without due process of law."); Kaiser
Aetna, 444 U.S. at 174 (the power of Congress to acquire an easement is separate from the issue
of whether Congress must then pay for that easement).
But, in other modern cases the distinction remains unclear. Cf Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3146 (1987) ("We have long recognized that land use regulation does
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the question of just compensation, however, are separate and distinct
inquiries. 291
Before ever addressing the issue of just compensation, practitioners
should determine whether the regulation is a proper exercise of the
police power. 292 If a regulation is not a proper exercise of the police
power, 293 there is no need to consider the just compensation issue; the
regulation is invalid and unenforceable. 294
As in the area of just compensation, the inquiry is factual. 295 The
Court, however, has identified three prongs which must be satisfied by
a real property regulation in order to provide substantive due process.296 First, the regulation must have a public purpose, 297 second, the
not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' . . .") (emphasis
added) (citations omitted); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("The application of a
general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests
.. ") (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) ("a use restriction on real property may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public
purpose, . .") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
291.
The just-compensation clause addresses the question of whether a particular valid government act has resulted in a taking which requires compensation; the more general
substantive due process question is whether the act is a valid exercise of government
power at all, irrespective of whether any property is taken or only freedom (liberty) is
affected. Confusion of the two serves no purpose and suggests that the government may
exceed its constitutional powers as long as it pays a price to those who would complain.
Humbach, supra note 18, at 275.
292. "The issue of compensation cannot even arise until the question of justification has been
disposed of." R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, !99 (1985), quoted in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association
v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1246 n.22 (1987). See generally Kalis, Citadels of Privilege:
Exclusionary Land Use Regulations and the Presumption of Constitutional Validity, 8 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 585 (1981).
293. The following discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the Court's
police power/due process analysis. It is simply intended to make the reader aware of the possible
role of substantive due process analysis in a regulatory taking claim. A companion issue which
will not be discussed in this comment, but which should also be considered, is whether a regulation unfairly discriminates among similarly situated landowners in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See generally Karst, The Fifth Amendment Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55
N.C.L. REV. 540 (1977).
294. For example, laws regulating the use of property based on one's political or religious
views are unenforceable, even if the government is willing to compensate the owner. Williamson
County v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 202 n.1 (1985). Cf Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145 (the
Court indicated that the imposition of the easement was a "taking" of property which would
require just compensation if that issue was addressed separately, but it was the imposition of an
easement without due process which rendered the government's regulation invalid).
295. 'The line which in this field separates the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of
power is not capable of precise delimitation. It varies with circumstances and conditions." Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
296. Cf Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) reaffirmed in Goldblatt v. Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962):
To justify the State in
. interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
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regulation must be efficient, 298 and third, the regulation must substantially advance a legitimate state interest. 299

1.

Proper governmental purpose

Unless a government's intent in enacting a regulation was to deprive a property owner of his constitutionally protected rights, 300 the
purpose of most regulations will be considered proper. The main limitation is that the police power may only be used to promote community
objectives, rather than purely private301 objectives. 302 A lack of public
purpose was the downfall of the Kohler Act in Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon. 303 Since Pennsylvania Coal, however, the Court has given
appear, first, that the interests of the public . . require such interference; and, second,
that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
[third, the means are] not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
297. See infra notes 300-14 and accompanying text.
298. See infra notes 315-330 and accompanying text.
299. See infra notes 331-345 and accompanying text.
300. Cf Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (It is a violation of due process if the
government's "real object is not to protect the community, or to promote the general well-being,
but, under the guise of police regulation, to deprive the owner of his liberty or property, without
due process of law." See e.g., Bydlon v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (government was prohibited by statute from condemning plaintiffs resort land, so in an effort to compel
evacuation of the property, it banned flights below 4,000 feet over plaintifrs resort, thereby
preventing access by air of customers and supplies, the order was invalidated).
One suspect area would be government exactions demanded from developers. See generally
Van Alstyne, supra note 18, at 61 ("An arbitrarily conceived exaction will be nullified as a disguised attempt to take private property for public use without resource to eminent domain"). Cf
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) (the lack of a proper nexus for a
dedication of property made the regulation "an out-and-out plan of extortion").
301. One example of an improper private purpose would be the practical creation of a monopoly which "enhance[s] the private economic position of existing businesses rather than the
public welfare." Van Alstyne supra note 18, at 19 (citing In re White, 195 Cal. 516, 234 P. 396
(1925))
302. Incidental private gains are not sufficient to invalidate a regulation if its primary purpose is to promote a public interest. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (redevelopment
plan was constitutional even though it created the potential of large private gains to developers
because it also created the public benefit of slum clearance); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 56
U.S.L.W. 4168, 4171 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1988) ("Indeed, a primary goal of rent control is the protection of tenants.").
303. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The Kohler Act prohibited underground coal mining if it would
cause the subsidence of privately owned surface structures. This regulation was enacted despite the
fact that the mining companies owned the support estate which, under Pennsylvania law, gave
them the right to cause such subsidence. Since the regulation exempted land where the support
estate and the surface estate were owned by one owner, the Court held that there was no "public
interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected
rights." /d. at 414.
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broad deference 304 to legislative determinations that a regulation performs a public purpose. 306
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 306 the
public purpose issue was resurrected in a challenge to a subsidence act
similar to the act which was invalidated in Pennsylvania Coal. In Keystone, however, the Court willingly found a public purpose sufficient to
distinguish the Keystone case from Pennsylvania Coal, despite the fact
that the effective purposes of both acts were the same. 307
In Pennell v. City of San jose, 308 the plaintiffs complained that
the primary objective of the challenged regulation was private. The rent
control regulation permitted a Hearing Officer when determining the
reasonableness of a proposed rent increase, by an individual landlord,
to consider the economic impact that the increase may have upon an
individual tenant. 309 The plaintiffs claimed that the regulation "serves
only the purpose of providing assistance to 'hardship tenants,' " 310 and
that "[ t ]he objective of alleviating individual tenant hardship is . . . not
a 'policy the legislature is free to adopt in a rent control ordinance.' " 311
In rejecting the plaintiff's contentions, the Court summarily held 312 that
304. The Court's deference stems in part from a reluctance to limit the exercise of the police
power, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) ("It is to be remembered that we are
dealing with one of the most essential powers of government, one that is least limitable."), and in
part from a recognition that courts are ill-equipped to second guess the legitimacy of local governmental action. "State legislatures and city councils, who deal with the situation from a practical
standpoint, are better qualified than the courts to determine the necessity, character and degree of
regulation which these new and perplexing conditions require . . ." Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S.
603, 608 ( 1927) (zoning setback lines do not amount to a taking of property without substantive
due process).
305. See e.g., Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (Hawaii permitted to
divest major landowners of part of their property in order to distribute the land to others); Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) ("When the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.").
306. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
307. One of the critical distinctions made by the Court in Keystone was that the regulation in
Pennsylvania Coal did not cover land where the surface and the mineral estate were owned by
one party; whereas the regulation at issue in Keystone did not automatically exempt such property.
The effect of the two regulations, however, were the same since the regulation in Keystone had a
provision allowing a waiver by the surface owner. The waiver would obviously be exercised if all
three estates were jointly held. See Brief for the Petitioners at 21 n.23, Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, I 07 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
308. 56 U.S.L.W. 4168 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1988).
309. If the Officer "determines that the proposed increase constitutes an unreasonably severe
financial or economic hardship on a particular tenant, he may order that the . . mcrease . . . be
disallowed." !d. at 4169 (quoting San Jose Municipal Ordinance 19696, § 5703.29).
310. /d. at 4170. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
311. !d. at 4171 (quoting Reply Brief for Appellants 16).
312. "[T]o the extent that the appellants' due process argument is based on the claim that the
ordinance forces individual landlords to subsidize individual tenants, that claim is premature and
not presented by the facts before us." /d. at 4171 n.7.
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the regulation served a legitimate state interest since "a pnmary purpose of rent control is the protection of tenants." 313
In general, if public-oriented reasons are offered as justification for
a regulation and they are "sufficiently cogent," 314 deference will be
given to the government as to whether the regulation serves a public
rather than private objective.

2.

Social efficiency

A regulation violates the Due Process Clause if its "provisions are
clearly arbitrary a11d unreasonable." 3111 One method utilized by the
Court in determining whether a regulation is unreasonable is to determine whether the regulation is "socially efficient." 316 A regulation is
"socially efficient" if, in light of its benefits to society and its harms to
the individual, it improves society on the whole. 317 This requires a balancing analysis. The harm imposed by the regulation upon the individual property owner, is balanced against the increased benefits to society.318 If the harm to the property owner exceeds the general benefit of
the regulation, 319 the regulation is socially inefficient. 320
The important factors of this balancing test were identified in
Goldblatt v. Hempstead. 321 The plaintiff challenged the constitutional313. !d. An additional public purpose identified by the Court was the prevention of the
social cost of dislocation of low-income tenants in the event a landlord charges rents they could not
afford. !d. at 4171 n.8.
314. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
315. !d.
316. Cf Comment, Zoning, supra note 4, at 1482.
317. "If the gain to the public is small . . . and the hardship to the landowner is great, no
valid reason exists for the exercise of such police power." Langguth v. Village of Mount Prospect,
5 Ill. 2d. 69, 124 N.E.2d. 879, 880 (1955). See generally Comment, Balancing, supra note 12, at
332.
318. Under a purely utilitarian approach, a property owner's harm may seldom be severe
enough to outweigh the benefits to society, but the constitutional protections of property provided
in the Fifth Amendment increase the weight given to any harm to the individual.
319. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,414 (1922), the Court applied this
balancing test and held that "[ t ]he statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant
so extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights." It should be noted,
however, that the Court only applied the balancing test to the first half of the Court's decision
which was an analysis of the substantive due process provided by the regulation.
This balancing test does not apply to the issue of just compensation which was discussed in
the second portion of the Pennsylvania Coal decision. The Court assumed in the second section
that the subsidence of the public streets, unlike the subsidence of the private house, constituted an
"emergency . . that would warrant the exercise of eminent domain." !d. at 416.
320. Another term which may be used is "unsuitable." See generally Van Alstyne, supra
note 18, at 29-32. A property owner "may conceivably persuade a court that enforcement of declared zoning policy with respect to the particular parcel would make little or no sense." !d. at 30.
321. 369 U.S. 590 (1962). See also Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980) ("In assessing the fairness of the zoning ordinance, these [general] benefits must be considered along with any
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ity of a safety regulation which prohibited excavation of a sand and
gravel pit below the level of the water table. 322 Focusing solely323 on
the reasonableness 324 of the regulation, the Court stated that it would
"need to know such things as the nature of the menace against which it
will protect, the availability and effectiveness of other less drastic protective steps, and the loss which appellants will suffer from the imposition of the ordinance." 32 ~
Even though great deference has typically been given as to the reasonableness of a regulation, this due process balancing test is critical to
a discussion of regulatory takings. 326 This balancing test has the potential to cause considerable confusion. When addressing "regulatory taking" claims, 327 courts are tempted to hold that a regulation does not
require compensation when there is a great public need for the regulation.328 But, as Justice Holmes warned; "We are in danger of forgetdiminution in market value that the appellants might suffer.").
322. By the end of the first year the excavation had reached the water table which was
located near the surface. Further excavation created a 20 acre lake with an average depth of 25
feet. The property owners claimed that since they were required to stop operations before all of
the sand and gravel were excavated, the safety regulation was a "taking" of their property without
due process. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 591.
323. The Court did not address the issue of just compensation because there was no evidence
in the record to support a finding that the regulation went "too far." /d. at 594.
324. The Court indicated that "[ e ]xcept for the substitution of the familiar standard of 'reasonableness,' this Court has generally refrained from announcing any specific criteria" for identifying an invalid use of the police power. /d. at 594-95 (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137
(1894). See supra note 296).
325. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 595. The challenger to a regulation has the burden to prove the
regulation unreasonable, and in this case, he failed to do so. ld. at 596. Cf Michelman, supra
note 18, passim ("Net Efficiency Gains" are balanced against "Demoralization Costs" and "Settlement Costs").
326. In general, when a regulation's reasonableness is debatable, the regulation is reasonable.
"In such circumstances, the settled rule of this Court is that it will not substitute its judgment for
that of the legislative body charged with the primary duty and responsibility of determining the
question." Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 514 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
327. Part of the confusion no doubt comes from similar factors found in each test. Just compensation analysis considers the "unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property"
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978), while the substantive due process analysis considers whether the regulation is "unduly oppressive upon the individual." Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
328. Compare Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 423
N.E.2d 320 (1981) rev'd 458 U.S. 418 (1982) (applying the balancing test to justify a physical
occupation of private property without the payment of just compensation) with Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1982). The Supreme Court did not
question the New York Court of Appeals' determination that the statute served the legitimate
public purpose of "rapid development of and maximum penetration by a means of communication
which has important educational and community aspects." The Court held that, "It is a separate
question, however, whether an otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights that compensation must be paid." The Court concluded "that a permanent physical occupation authorized
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ting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." 329 It should be remembered
that the balancing of public gain and private harm applies only to Due
Process Clause analysis of whether a regulation is unreasonable or arbitrary. 330 It does not justify a regulatory taking of private property
without just compensation.

3.

"Substantially advances" ends-means nexus

The third substantive due process prong utilized by the Court is
the requirement that there be a proper ends-means nexus. 331 Whereas
the previous prong looked to the efficiency of the regulation, this prong
looks to its effectiveness. The proper inquiry has repeatedly been identified as whether the regulation "substantially advances" a legitimate
state interest. 332 Despite the frequent reiteration of the test, however,
the Court has yet to define its terms. 333 Only two real property regulations have been invalidated by the Supreme Court for failing to sub-

by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve." /d. (emphasis
added).

329. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 416.
330. But cf Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 6, passim (utilizing the various "taking" factors as
elements to determine "whether the private losses imposed by regulatory measures are reasonably
proportionate to the benefits secured thereby.").
331. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) ("If therefore, a statute purporting to
have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real
substantial relation to those objects, . . it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give
effect to the Constitution.").

332. See e.g. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (a regulation "effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests"); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
85 (1980) ("[T]he guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real
and substantial relation to the objective sought to be obtained.") (quoting Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502, 523, 525 (1934)); Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) ("such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals
or general welfare."); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 610 (1927) (set-back requirements were not
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare.") (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926));
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) ("no real or substantial relation to those objects").
But see Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 ("reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
public purpose").
333. "Our cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a
'legitimate state interest' or what type of connection between the regulation and the state interest
satisfies the requirement that the former 'substantially advance' the latter." Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at
3147.
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stantially advance a legitimate state interest; Nectow v. Cambridge, 334
and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. 336
In Nectow, zoning boundaries divided an individual parcel of
property into two different land-uses; residential and industrial. The
majority of the parcel was zoned industrial, but a strip, 100 feet wide,
was zoned residential. 336 Based upon the finding of the court appointed
master that "the health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the
inhabitants of the part of the city affected will not be promoted by the
disposition [of the boundaries J made by the ordinance," 337 the Court
held that the regulation did not bear a substantial relation to the objectives sought and was therefore unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission forced the plaintiffs
to convey a public easement across their beachfront in order to obtain a
building permit. 338 The Coastal commission claimed that its "power to
forbid construction of the house in order to protect the public's view of
the beach must surely include the power to condition construction upon
some concession by the owner, even a concession of property rights, that
serves the same end." 339
The Court agreed that a government could impose a less restrictive
condition so long as the condition advanced the same purpose as would
a complete prohibition. 340 It then held that the permit condition at issue
lacked such a nexus. 341 The condition did not, and could not, serve the
334. 277 U.S. 183 ( 1928).
335. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
336. Justice Sutherland pointed out that the Court saw no reason why all of the plaintiff's
property was not included in the industrial zone. "There does not appear to be any reason why
this should not be done. Nevertheless, if that were all, we should not be warranted in substituting
our judgment for that of the zoning authorities primarily charged with the duty and responsibility
of determining the question." Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188.
337. /d. (emphasis added).
338. The Commission claimed that "a permit condition that serves the same legitimate public
purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue
the permit would not constitute a taking." Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3147.
339. /d. at 3148.
340. As an example of a less restrictive condition which would not advance the same end as a
complete prohibition, the Court used the familiar prohibition against shouting "fire" in a crowded
auditorium. While a government clearly has the power to restrict dangerous speech in such a
situation, a government could not allow the shouting of fire upon the payment of a $100 tax; even
though such a condition would be less restrictive than an outright ban on such speech. A monetary
contribution would not, and could not, prevent the harm which justifies the government in prohibiting the shouting of fire, therefore there is no nexus between the condition and the purpose of the
ban. /d.
341. "We can accept, for purposes of discussion, the Commission's proposed test as to how
close a 'fit' between the condition and the burden is required, because we fmd that this case does
not even meet the most untailored standards." /d.
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limited public interest which justified the initial imposition of the permit requirement. 3 " 2 The lack of a nexus between the limited public
interest and the condition imposed upon the Nollans made the regulation "an out and out plan of extortion." 3 " 3 Nollan may be an indication that the present Court is willing to apply substantive due process
analysis with some bite. 3 "" While the issues regarding the proper endsmeans nexus are far from decided, 3 " 11 it is likely that Nollan will be the
catalyst for many more constitutional challenges to the ends-means relationship of real property regulations.
342. In essence, the Coastal Commission was unable to impose the condition berause its
powers were limited to providing greater access to the sea, not along the sea, id. at 3145; but,
California is still free to pursue a public easement along the beachfront if it does so by eminent
domain. ld. at 3150.
343. Id. at 3148. Since the condition did not advance the original purpose of the permit
requirement, the Court indicated that the purpose of the condition became corrupt and was no
longer a legitimate state interest.
The lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was. The purpose then
becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental
purpose, but without payment of compensation. Whatever may be the outer limits of
'legitimate state interests' in the takings and land use context, this is not one of them.
In short, unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use, but an out
and out plan of extortion.

Id. (emphasis added). Cf Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669 (a regulation is invalid when the "real objert"
of a police power regulation is the deprivation of constitutional rights).
344. In the past, the Court has given little more than lip service to this "substantial advancement" test. Agins, 447 U.S. 255, is a typical example. The Court summarily accepted the government's claim that the ordinance substantially advanced the state's legitimate interests. In reality,
all the Court did was state that there was a legitimate interest.
In this case, the zoning ordinances substantially advance legitimate governmental
goals. The State of California has determined that the development of local open-space
plans will discourage the "premature and unnecessary conversion of open-space land to
urban uses." The specific zoning regulations at issue are exercises of the city's police
powers to protect the residents of Tiburon from the ill-effects of urbanization. Such
governmental purposes long have been recognized as legitimate.

Id. at 261. Cf Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (a regulation is a taking if it is not "reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public
purpose.").
Even if the Court is willing to apply the test, the plaintiff carries the burden of proving that
the regulation does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest. See Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85 (1980) ("Appellants have failed to provide sufficient justification for concluding that this test is not satisfied.").
345. For example, whether the ends-means standard for a facial due process challenge differs
from an "as applied" due process challenge. Cf Pennell v. City of San Jose, 56 U.S.L.W. 4168,
4171 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1988) (holding that the facial challenge to the regulation failed because the
regulation "represents a rational attempt to accommodate the conflicting interests," rather than
utilizing the "substantially advancing language").
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CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court's decisions may seem random and
confusing, the impacts and issues discussed in this comment are emerging as the critical factors which must be addressed in any regulatory
taking claim. One may approach the Court's current formulations of
unduly harsh impacts, along with the issues identified, in a hierarchical
order, addressing the most dispositive issues and impacts first.
First, one should examine the substantive due process issues to determine whether the regulation serves a public objective, 346 is socially
efficient, 347 and substantially advances a legitimate state interest. 348 If a
regulation lacks substantive due process it is invalidated and the question of just compensation becomes moot.
The next issue to address is whether the regulation qualifies for
the exceptions to the just compensation clause. If a regulation abates a
nuisance 349 or provides an average reciprocity of advantage, 350 the regulation and its impacts are outside the control of the fifth amendment
and the taking claim will necessarily fail.
Once it is determined that the just compensation clause limits the
challenged regulation, one must consider the ripeness of the property
owner's taking claim. Unless the claim is a facial challenge, 351 it is necessary to determine how the regulation has been applied to the plaintiff's property. A property owner must show that the regulation has
actually been applied to his property because all possible variances have
been denied. 352 He must also show what permissible uses remain so
that the Court may determine the effect of the regulation's application
to the property. 353 In addition to showing how a regulation has been
applied to the property, a property owner must also show that he has
been denied just compensation. 354 Unless the forgoing conditions are
met, a taking claim is not ripe for adjudication because it has not yet
caused a constitutional injury to the property owner.
If all of the foregoing issues are decided in favor of the property
owner, one may then properly consider the merits of the taking claim.
It is only at this point that the impacts of a regulation become directly
relevant. It remains to be seen which regulatory impacts identified by
346.
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the Court will develop into significant tests of regulatory confiscation.
Since the impacts are not mutually exclusive, and since there is no certainty as to which form of confiscation the Court may use to analyze a
given fact situation, all impacts should be addressed.
The "permanent physical occupation" 31111 and "easement" 3116 impacts have been employed with enough regularity, and reflect enough of
the traditional notions of inverse condemnation, that they may be relied
upon. If either of these impacts are indicated by the facts of a given
case, the probability of a successful takings claim are high.
The "use" impacts, i.e., the destruction of all beneficial use 3117 and
the deprivation of all economically viable use, 3118 have received much lip
service from the Court because of their theoretical similarity to formal
condemnation. These impacts have not played a significant role in the
Court's past decisions. They may, however, increase in importance as
the Court addresses fewer facial challenges and hears more "as applied" cases since the "use" impacts contribute little or nothing to the
adjudication of facial challenges, but may contribute more when a regulation is applied to specific property and the Court has a record of
injuries to which it may apply its analysis.
The impact of an "undue interference with investment-backed expectations"3119 is firmly established upon the principles of justice and
fairness, but, because it is truly an ad hoc factual inquiry, many more
cases are needed in order to define its terms. The Court has not explained what it means by "investment-backed," and has said little as to
what is a "reasonable expectation." Because of this lack of preciseness,
this impact is presently a weak, albeit valid, basis upon which to allege
a taking claim. As the Court's formulation of this impact is refined, as
it will be over time, its importance and usefulness may increase.
The impact of "privately funded social reform," 360 as recently proposed by Justice Scalia in Pennell v. City of San Jose, 361 has not been
previously considered by the Court and therefore has little precedential
value and is currently the weakest impact to allege. Justice Scalia's
"cause-and-effect" formulation, however, accurately reflects the Court's
pronouncements that the Fifth Amendment is designed to prevent government from "forcing some people alone to bear public burdens,
which in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
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whole." 362 The "privately finded social reform" impact may develop
into the most predictable and helpful impact of all.
The Supreme Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence is far from
being settled, but it is developing rapidly. In the past, practitioners and
courts have had little guidance from the Supreme Court as to the
proper analysis of regulatory takings claims under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. As the issues and impacts discussed in this comment are incorporated into the preparation of regulatory takings claims,
the Court will have an opportunity to refine its formulations and define
its tests. The only thing that is certain is that as long as there are real
property regulations, the judicial quest to draw the line of regulatory
confiscation will continue.

Douglas Short

362. Armstrong v. United Stales, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).

